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ABSTRACT—————————————————————————————————————
This paper analyzes the firm’s choice between serving a foreign market through exports or through
foreign affiliate sales in an environment characterized by country-specific shocks to the cost of
production. Our model predicts that country pairs with less correlated output fluctuations trade
more, relative to affiliate sales, while countries with more volatile fluctuations are served rela-
tively more by exporters than by foreign affiliates selling abroad. Using detailed data on trade
from Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2002) and affiliate sales from the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis, we find empirical support for our model’s predictions.
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1 Introduction
The foreign direct investment literature has focused primarily on two ways through which firms
serve foreign buyers: They can export domestically-produced goods or they can supply the des-
tination market with goods produced by foreign affiliates, a form of foreign direct investment
(FDI).1 In this literature, the choice over production locations weighs the gains from avoiding
transportation costs against the diseconomies of scale that result from splitting production across
multiple affiliates. This choice is known as the proximity-concentration tradeoff, and it has become
the dominant framework for studying horizontal FDI.2
Models of the proximity-concentration tradeoff are typically static, but creating a foreign af-
filiate or an export network is inherently an investment requiring significant upfront costs.3 In a
stochastic environment, when deciding how to serve a foreign market, a firm weighs these initial
costs against the expected future profits that will accrue from producing abroad or from exporting.
In forming expectations about future profit flows, the firm must take into account the stochastic
properties of production costs and demand, both within and across countries. In this paper, we
ask: How does country-specific risk affect the way firms choose to serve a foreign market?
We construct a general-equilibrium multi-country model with heterogeneous firms that choose
to serve a foreign market by exporting or by opening a foreign affiliate. Our model is an extension
of the set-up in Helpman et al. (2004) to an stochastic environment that, in turn, is taken from
the international business cycle literature, as in Stockman and Tesar (1995). Country-specific pro-
ductivity shocks endogenously generate pro-cyclical unit costs of production, as it is found in the
data: Country’s wages are higher when demand and output are large.
The crucial difference between exporting and using a foreign affiliate is the location of produc-
tion. Exporters produce in the source country and, thus, their unit costs of production fluctuate
with home country shocks. Foreign affiliates produce in the destination country, so their unit costs
fluctuate with host country shocks.4
1Other ways in which firms may serve foreign markets include licensing and exporting from a third country.
2See, among others, Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004).
3Recent studies have found start-up costs associated with exporting to be considerable. See Das, Roberts and Tybout
(2007) and Ruhl and Willis (2010) for a discussion.
4The assumption that foreign affiliates are subject to host country risk is consistent with the literature on international
portfolio diversification and home bias. Shares of multinational firms can be an alternative way of achieving such
diversification. See, for example, Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1999), Rowland and Tesar (2004), and Cai and Warnock
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Given our assumptions, the model has two key predictions: Firms will prefer to export, rather
than use foreign affiliates, to serve countries whose business cycles are less correlated with those
in their home countries, and countries with greater business-cycle volatility are more likely to be
served by exporters than by foreign affiliates. When we study the data on U.S. exports and U.S.
multinational corporations, we find support for these predictions of the model.
The intuition behind our results follows from combining the basic assumption of expected-
profit maximizing firms and the stochastic properties of the production cost and aggregate de-
mand in each destination country. A firm’s unit cost of production, relative to its competitors,
determines the firm’s market share. Everything else equal, a firm’s expected profits are higher
when its market share and its demand are high at the same time. That is, expected profits are
higher when the covariance between the unit cost of production (relative to its competitors) and
the demand for its product is lower, even negative. Even when agents are risk-neutral, it is still
true that the pattern of international risk affects the location of production.5
In our model, states of nature in which demand is high in a country are also states in which
the wage is high in that country. This implies that foreign affiliates, who hire local labor and sell
to the local market, have high production costs exactly when demand is high. Exporters, on the
other hand, pay home-country wages, which are driven by shocks in the home country. If the
home-country business cycle negatively comoves with the destination country’s business cycle,
then exporters have a low unit cost, relative to the competition in the destination market, in states
of nature with high demand, increasing expected profits. The stronger the negative correlation
between the two countries, the more advantageous it is to export rather than sell through foreign
affiliates.
Our second result—that more-volatile countries are more likely to be served by exporters—
follows directly from the convexity of the firm’s profit function in its cost of production relative
to the that of its competitors. Everything else equal, the expected profits of a risk-neutral firm are
increasing in the volatility of its unit cost. Intuitively, a profit-maximizing firm optimally adjusts
its production to the realization of its production cost: It expands production when its cost is lower
than that of its competitors and contracts production when the realization is unfavorable. Since a
(2006).
5For a framework with risk-averse firms, see Rowland and Tesar (2004).
3
foreign affiliate hires labor in the host country, its unit cost fluctuates together with the local firms,
which are its main competition. A firm exporting to the country, on the other hand, hires labor in
its home country, so that fluctuations in the destination-country wages translate into fluctuations
in the exporter’s unit cost of production relative to those of the firms located in the destination
market. In more volatile destination countries, the exporter’s cost difference will fluctuate more.
This means that an exporter’s expected profits are increasing in the volatility of the destination
country.
We test the predictions of our model on U.S. trade and affiliate sales data that cover 52 manu-
facturing industries and 38 countries. We use confidential firm-level data on affiliate sales of U.S.
multinationals from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to build measures of affiliate sales
by industry-country that are comparable to the aggregation of the trade data. Additionally, since
our theoretical results are about arm’s-length exports and affiliate sales to local unrelated parties,
we use the firm-level data to build an export measure that is free of intra-firm exports from U.S.
parents to affiliates abroad, and to restrict affiliate sales to include only sales made to local un-
affiliated parties.6 In this way, our empirical results are not contaminated by flows that might
respond to motives other than those in the model. The data support the model’s predictions: Out-
put volatility and cross-country output correlations are significant predictors of the ratio of trade
to affiliate sales across countries. Consider the impact of increasing the output covariance of the
50th percentile country (Spain) to that of the 75th percentile country (Ireland). Doing so decreases
the ratio of exports to affiliates sales by 26 percent, from an average of 0.23 to 0.30. Analogously,
increasing the output volatility of the 25th percentile country (Switzerland) to the 75 percentile
country (Finland) increases the ratio of exports to affiliate sales by 40 percent, from an average of
1.17 to 1.64.
This paper builds on several literatures. The literature on the proximity-concentration tradeoff,
such as Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), and Helpman et al. (2004), focuses on the implications
of the firm’s choice between horizontal FDI and arm’s-length trade in deterministic models. This
6We focus on these two types of flows because—by a large margin—the main destination of affiliates’ sales is to local
unrelated parties, as shown in figure 1 and table 1. Vertical FDI, which is characterized by the movement of goods
between the parent and affiliate, is less important: While it is true that intra-firm trade flows are large (particularly
North-North flows) as a fraction of total trade, they are a small fraction of affiliate sales for the median multinational
firm, irrespective of the destination country or the industry of operation. For more details on the characteristics of U.S.
multinationals, see Ramondo, Rappoport and Ruhl (2012).
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literature typically finds that exporting, relative to affiliate sales, is decreasing in variables that
proxy for transportation costs and is decreasing in country size, which is meant to proxy for the
importance of scale economies. Our theoretical contribution is to extend these models to a world
with uncertainty, retaining the predictions of the deterministic models while adding predictions
about how business cycle characteristics influence the choice between exporting and building for-
eign affiliates.
Our work also builds on the literature that has studied the effect of uncertainty on FDI and ex-
porting separately. The literature that focuses on uncertainty and trade—while not controlling for
affiliate sales—has documented a positive relationship between bilateral trade and the correlation
of output fluctuations between trading partners.7 This pattern in the data is difficult to replicate
in models that take the output correlation between countries as primitive, as in the international
business cycle literature studied in Kose and Yi (2006).8 Our model also takes the underlying
uncertainty as a primitive, but it offers the firm an additional mode to serve foreign countries,
namely the possibility of building a foreign affiliate. Our framework yields the prediction that ex-
ports relative to affiliate sales should be decreasing in the cross-country correlation of output, which
is confirmed by the data.
The literature that focuses on the effects of country risk on FDI—while not controlling for
exports—has reached inconclusive results, both theoretically and empirically. For example, Gold-
berg and Kolstad (1995) find that bilateral real exchange rate volatility increases FDI, while Aizen-
man and Marion (2004) find that volatility of both the terms of trade and output per worker de-
creases FDI. Russ (2007a, 2007b) shows how the relationship between FDI and uncertainty de-
pends crucially on the source of the uncertainty. As in Russ (2007a, 2007b), the source of uncer-
tainty matters for our model, but we can use the observed relationships between aggregate vari-
ables to discipline our specification of the model’s shocks. Once we have modeled uncertainty
in a way that is consistent with the data, our model has the unambiguous prediction that greater
volatility in the destination country increases the likelihood of serving a market by exporting, and
7See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1998), Clark and van Wincoop (2001), and Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005).
8This has led several researchers to construct models that reverse the direction of causality: Deeper trade relationships
help to synchronize the business cycles across countries. Explanations in this line of research include vertical special-
ization, off-shoring, and similarities in the industrial structure across countries. See Frankel and Rose (1998), Kose and
Yi (2001), Calderon, Chong and Stein (2007), Burstein, Kurz and Tesar (2008), Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), and
Bergin, Feenstra and Hanson (2009).
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this prediction is borne out by the data.
A small, but growing, literature analyzes the dynamic behavior of exporting and multinational
firms under uncertainty. These papers focus on the large sunk investments entailed in opening af-
filiates and analyze the resulting option value of delaying FDI and supplying the market through
exports in the meantime. See, for example, Rob and Vettas (2003), Irrazabal and Opromolla (2009),
and Fillat and Garetto (2010). Our paper complements this literature, as it also characterizes the
firm’s export and FDI decision facing an initial sunk cost. Our model would also generate qualita-
tively similar revenue fluctuations for affiliates and exporting firms. However, our paper is aimed
at different questions. Our focus is not on the characterization of the firm’s time-series dynamics,
per se, but on the cross-country distribution of export and FDI flows that results from the firm’s
choices.
Finally, in a line of reasoning closer to ours, Lewis (2011) regresses the export-to-affiliate-
sales ratio on nominal volatility and finds that exporting is more common to countries with more
volatility—a result that is consistent with our findings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and section 3 analyzes the
proximity-concentration tradeoff under uncertainty. Section 4 derives the model’s empirical pre-
dictions and presents the data and the results. In section 5, we consider alternative specifications
of the baseline estimations. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop a model in which firms choose how to serve a foreign market. Trade
and multinational production are alternative ways to reach foreign consumers in the tradable-
good sector. Firms face the proximity-concentration tradeoff: Exporting firms are subject to per-
unit transportation costs, but they pay small fixed costs of entering a foreign market. In contrast,
opening a foreign affiliate bypasses the transportation cost of shipping goods, but firms face large
fixed costs of entering the foreign market.
We model uncertainty as a country-specific productivity shock that affects the local unit cost of
production. Shocks to the cost of production affect all plants located in a country, both nationally-
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owned and foreign affiliates. This implies that an exporter’s cost of production is affected by
shocks in the home country, while a multinational producer’s relevant shock is in the host country.
As a result, a profit-maximizing firm deciding to serve a foreign market, either by exporting or by
opening an affiliate, must consider the joint distribution of source and host country shocks.
In the model, the firm’s choice between exporting and FDI depends on the comovement of
relative production costs and demand. We specify the structure of shocks in the model so that, in
equilibrium, there is a positive comovement between the unit cost of production and the demand
for goods in each country, as found in the data.
2.1 Setup
The world consists of I countries, each endowed with an inelastic supply of labor, Li, i = 1, . . . , I .
Each country is populated by risk-neutral entrepreneurs/consumers with preferences over trad-
able and non-tradable goods. Firms set up foreign affiliates and export networks before country
shocks are realized, and, after uncertainty is resolved, production occurs.
The vector s ∈ S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} denotes the (finite number of) states of nature in the second
period, each occurring with probability Pr(s). Each state of nature is characterized by a vector of
country-specific shocks, A(s) = [A1(s), ..., AI(s)]. Without loss of generality,
∑
S Pr(s)Ai(s) = 1
for i = 1, ..., I .9
Preferences
Consumers are risk-neutral and maximize expected consumption in the second period,
Ui =
∑
S
Pr(s)Ci(s).
Consumption aggregates tradable and non-tradable goods with constant expenditure shares,
Ci(s) = Ai(s)C
N
i (s)
αCTi (s)
1−α. (1)
The variables CTi (s) and C
N
i (s) correspond to composite tradable and non-tradable goods made
9Differences in the mean productivity level across countries can be equivalently expressed as differences in the size of
the labor endowment, Li.
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up of tradable and non-tradable varieties,
CTi (s) =
[∫
ω∈ΩTi c
T
i (ω, s)
η−1
η dω
] η
η−1
, CNi (s) =
[∫
ω∈ΩNi c
N
i (ω, s)
η−1
η dω
] η
η−1
, (2)
where ΩTi and Ω
N
i are the sets of tradable and non-tradable varieties available in country i, and
η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The demand functions for each tradable
variety, cTi (ω, s), and each non-tradable variety, c
N
i (ω, s), have the standard constant-elasticity-of-
substitution form, as do the associated tradeable and non-tradable good price indices, denoted by
P Ti (s) and P
N
i (s). The price index for aggregate consumption in each state of nature is simply
Pi(s) = γAi(s)
−1PNi (s)
αP Ti (s)
1−α, (3)
where γ ≡ α−α(1− α)−(1−α) is a positive constant.
The variable Ai(s) in (1) denotes the exogenous, country-specific shock, the only source of
uncertainty in the model. This shock can be interpreted either as a taste shock or as a shock to the
relative productivity of producing tradable and non-tradable goods.
Let country U be the reference country, which, in our empirical work, will be the United States.
World financial markets are frictionless, and contracts are denominated in the consumption bun-
dle of country U , which we use as the numeraire.10 There exists a set of securities that pay units of
country U ’s consumption in state s. The second-period budget constraint for country i, and each
state s, is
Pi(s)Ci(s)− LiWi(s)−Πi(s)−Bi(s) = 0, s ∈ S, (4)
where Bi(s) are the holdings of contingent bonds. Πi(s) is the aggregate profits of all firms owned
by country i. Each country has an initial endowment of tradable goods, Bi(0), which is used to
finance the cost of setting up export networks and affiliates in the first period, before shocks are
realized. The first-period budget constraint is
S∑
s=1
ρ(s)Bi(s) + F
x
i + F
m
i = Bi(0), (5)
10This is equivalent to a model with currencies in which credit contracts are written in units of U ’s currency, and the
central bank of U implements a monetary policy that stabilizes PU . See Woodford (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz
(2005) for the introduction of similar financial contracts in a cashless economy.
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where Fmi and F
x
i correspond to the aggregate fixed costs paid by firms from country i in setting
up affiliates abroad and export networks, respectively. In equilibrium, the price of the bonds,
ρ(s), will be such that these international claims are in zero net supply in each state s. Moreover,
the price index for consumption, in equilibrium, will be proportional across countries, Pi(s) =
λi Pr(s)/ρ(s), where λi is the multiplier on the budget constraint resulting from combining (4)
and (5), and λU is simply the risk-free interest rate. Putting together this expression for prices
with the first-order condition for country U yields Pi = λi/λU , for all s: The consumption price
index in each country i is constant relative to the international numeraire across states of nature.
Hence, with frictionless financial markets and risk-neutral preferences, the only variation in the
bond prices across states of nature is given by the probability of the state,
ρ(s) = λU Pr(s). (6)
Note that (6) implies that all agents value consumption equally in each state of nature. This means
there exists a world-wide price for final consumption that is used as the unit of account for inter-
national financial contracts.11
By assuming complete markets and risk neutrality, we rule out consumption risk diversifi-
cation as a motive for the firm’s choice of production locations. With a complete set of state-
contingent instruments, consumption risk could be minimized without the costly reallocation of
production across countries: production reallocation is strictly inferior to using state-contingent
bonds to handle consumption risk.12 In addition, risk neutrality implies that consumption risk
does not affect agents’ welfare so, the objective of the firm is to maximize expected (real) profits.
Assuming that financial markets are complete may seem like a strong assumption in general,
but in respect to the multinational firm, it is not. The modern multinational firm, is (on average)
a large, financially sophisticated entity, with access to a broad range of financial instruments that
allow it to diversify the risk in its cash flows. Additionally, our empirical predictions are robust
to a model without complete markets. If we allow trade in only a single non-contingent bond, the
11An equivalent result is obtained in a setting with a freely tradable “outside” good, commonly used in international
trade models, which serves as unit of account for international transactions.
12See Ramondo and Rappoport (2010) for a model of FDI location choice under complete markets and risk-averse
agents. In that case, the firm maximizes expected profits discounted by the world stochastic discount factor, which,
contrary to the set-up presented here, is state-contingent.
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empirical predictions of our model for U.S. multinationals are unchanged.
Production of Tradable Goods
Each country is endowed with a continuum of tradable-good firms. Each tradable good, ω, is pro-
duced using labor, l, with a constant returns-to-scale technology and a firm-specific productivity,
z(ω), drawn from distribution Gi(z) with support [zmini ,∞): q(ω) = z(ω) l(ω). Firms have the op-
tion of serving a foreign country by exporting or by opening a foreign affiliate. Foreign affiliates
inherit the productivity parameter, z(ω), of their parent firm, as in Helpman et al. (2004).13 The
nationality of a firm determines from which distribution, Gi(z), the firm draws its productivity
parameter. This parameter is independently distributed across countries and firms.
Definition (Domestic Firm). A firm located in country i is said to be a domestic firm if the firm’s produc-
tivity parameter, z, is drawn from country i’s distribution, Gi(z).
Definition (Foreign Affiliate). A firm located in country j is said to be a foreign affiliate of country i,
j 6= i, if the firm’s productivity parameter, z, is drawn from country i’s distribution, Gi(z).
Both domestic firms and foreign affiliates are owned by the households in their countries of
origin—country i in the definitions above. The profits of the domestic firms and the foreign affili-
ates of i accrue to the households in country i.
Producers are monopolistic competitors who face ad valorem transportation costs when selling
from i to j, τij ≥ 1, and first-period fixed set-up costs of exporting and foreign direct investment,
fxij and f
m
ij . These assumptions, together with CES preferences, deliver the familiar constant mark-
up pricing rule. For a domestic firm or a foreign affiliate located in country j the price is,
pjj(z, s) = p
m
ij (z, s) =
η
η − 1
Wj(s)
z
, (7)
irrespective of the origin of the affiliate. Notice that we are taking advantage of the model’s struc-
ture by renaming each variety ω by its productivity z. This is for convenience: We no longer need
to keep track of variety “names”, but rather the measure of firms of type z.14
13This assumption is motivated by the work of Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), who find that foreign affiliates inherit
their parents’ management practices, that multinational firms are well-managed in every country in which they op-
erate, and that well-managed firms have higher productivity. A generalization of this assumption, as in Arkolakis,
Ramondo, Rodriguez-Clare and Yeaple (2012), will leave our results below unchanged.
14Since the only parameter that varies across tradable goods is the productivity of the firm that produces it, z (ω), and
varieties are symmetric in demand, each firm with productivity z will choose identical quantities and prices.
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The price charged by a firm from i selling to j by exporting is,
pxij(z, s) =
η
η − 1τij
Wi(s)
z
, (8)
where τij ≥ 1, τii = 1, and τinτnj > τij . Besides the iceberg transport cost τij , the prices of an
affiliate and exporter in country j differ in the unit cost of production. An exporter that produces
in i and sells to j pays Wi per unit of labor, while a foreign affiliate that produces in—and sells
to—j pays Wj . This is the key distinction between exporting and opening a foreign affiliate.
Given the linearity of the production function, the firm’s decision problem in each market can
be solved independently. Total profits for a firm with productivity z, from country i, are the sum
of its profits from selling domestically, piii, its profits from exporting, pixij and the profits earned by
its foreign affiliates, pimij ,
pii(z, s) = piii(z, s) +
I∑
j=1
ιxij(z)pi
x
ij(z, s) +
I∑
j=1
ιmij (z)pi
m
ij (z, s). (9)
The variables ιxij(z) and ι
m
ij (z) are, respectively, one if the firm exports or owns an affiliate in
country j, and zero otherwise.
Production of Non-tradable Goods
Each non-tradable good, ω, is produced using labor with a constant returns-to-scale technology.
For simplicity, non-tradable goods are supplied by domestic firms only that compete monopolisti-
cally, and that are homogeneous in productivity (within and across countries).15 This implies that
all non-tradable goods in country i have the same price, pNi (s) = (η/(η − 1))Wi(s), which in turn,
implies that PNi (s) = p
N
i (s).
2.2 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment
Firms in the tradable-good sector choose to become multinationals, to become exporters, or to
serve only the domestic market before the realization of the country-specific productivity. A firm
15It is for expositional simplicity that we do not allow FDI in the non-tradable sector. Since exporting is not available in
the non-tradeable sector and affiliates produce and sell in the destination market, the distinction between an affiliate
and a domestic non-tradeable-good firm does not generate new predictions. Our empirical exercise is consistent with
this approach: We exclude the non-tradable sectors.
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from country i that opens an affiliate in country j pays a fixed cost fmij . If it chooses to export to
country j, it pays a fixed cost fxij . We impose the following standard assumption of the relative
magnitudes of these costs.16
Assumption 1. fxij/f
m
ij ≤ (τijWi(s)/Wj(s))1−η ≤ 1, for all i, j = 1, . . . I , and states of nature s.
Assumption 1 restricts our attention to equilibria in which exports and FDI are both profitable
options for a positive number of firms. Moreover, it generates the proximity-concentration trade-
off because it implies that: (i) The marginal cost of producing abroad is less than the marginal cost
of producing domestically, Wj(s) ≤ τijWi(s) (otherwise, FDI would never be never profitable),
and (ii) the fixed cost of opening an affiliate is higher than that of exporting, fxij < f
m
ij , for all
country pairs i, j (otherwise, exporting would never be profitable).
We restrict the analysis to horizontal FDI: We do not allow for other parent-affiliate configura-
tions, such as “export platforms” or multi-modal arrangements in which a parent firm pays both
export and FDI fixed costs and decides how to serve a market after uncertainty is resolved, as in
Rob and Vettas (2003). Our focus on horizontal FDI is motivated by the data: The vast majority of
foreign affiliates of U.S. companies sell almost exclusively to local unaffiliated parties, as shown
in figure 1 and column 1 of table 1. In 1999, the average affiliate sold 75 percent of its output to
local unaffiliated parties (the average across 1994, 1999, and 2004 is 71 percent).17
The value (gross of fixed costs) of opening an affiliate in country j, for a firm with productivity
z from country i, is given by the expected value of profits discounted by the price of the contingent
claim, ρ. From (6), we know that this price is constant across states of nature, so the value of an
affiliate is proportional to expected profits,18
V mij (z) =
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)pimij (z, s) = λU
∑
s∈S
Pr(s)pimij (z, s). (10)
Analogously, the value of exporting to country j, for a firm with productivity z from country i, is
V xij (z) =
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)pixij(z, s) = λU
∑
s∈S
Pr(s)pixij(z, s). (11)
16See, for example, Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1993), and Helpman et al. (2004).
17A detailed account of the prevalence of horizontal FDI can be found in Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) and in
Ramondo et al. (2012).
18The proportionality term λU , constant across states of natures, can be understood as the risk-free discount factor.
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The choice between exporting and using an affiliate to serve a foreign market is a function of
the firm’s productivity. This relationship is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under assumption 1, for any firm from country i with productivity z, the choice between
exporting and using an affiliate to serve country j is characterized by two cutoff productivity values, zxij
and zmij , such that a firm with z
x
ij < z < z
m
ij will export to j and a firm with z
m
ij < z will use a foreign
affiliate to serve country j. This characterization holds for each country pair, i, j.
The proof of proposition 1 is in appendix A. Proposition 1 shows that the optimal FDI and
export decisions of firms from country i to j are characterized by two cutoff productivity levels,
zmij and z
x
ij , such that firms with these productivity levels earn zero expected profits from entry,
V xij
(
zxij
)
= fxij (12)
V mij
(
zmij
)− V xij (zmij ) = fmij − fxij . (13)
Firms with z ≥ zmij open affiliates in country j, firms with productivity z such that zxij ≤ z < zmij
export to j, and firms with z < zxij do not sell to j but still sell to their domestic market, and
possibly to other countries. The total fixed costs paid by firms from country i in setting up export
networks and foreign affiliates in the first period are, respectively,
Fmi =
I∑
j=1
[
1−Gi(zmij )
]
fmij , and (14)
F xi =
I∑
j=1
[
Gi(z
m
ij )−Gi(zxij)
]
fxij . (15)
Our assumption that the productivity of the affiliate is the same as the parent, along with
assumption 1, generates a sorting of firms by productivity (and size) that is consistent with the
data, as documented by Helpman et al. (2004): Firms that only sell domestically are less productive
than exporting firms, which are, in turn, less productive than multinational firms.19
19Moreover, these assumptions generate a sorting of firms in the host country that is consistent with the empirical
evidence presented by, among others, Doms and Jensen (1998) and Girma, Thompson and Wright (2002), who find
that foreign-owned firms are more productive than domestically-owned firms.
13
2.3 Equilibrium
Definition. Given the initial endowments, {Bi(0)}Ii=1, an equilibrium is defined by the country-pair cutoff
rules zmij and z
x
ij , the quantities Ci(s), C
T
i (s), C
N
i (s), 〈cTij(z, s)〉z∈Z , cNi (s), 〈qij (z, s)〉z∈Z , and qNi (s),
the labor allocations 〈lTij (z, s)〉z∈Z , and lNi (s), and the prices ρ(s), 〈pTij (z, s)〉z∈Z , pNi (s), Wi(s), P Ti (s),
and PNi (s), for i, j = 1, . . . , I , such that, for each s ∈ S,
1. Prices, quantities, and labor allocations, {pTij(z, s), qij(z, s), lTij(z, s)}Ij=1, solve the profit maximiza-
tion problem of each tradable-good firm z in country i = 1, . . . , I .
2. Prices, quantities, and labor allocations, pNi (s), q
N
i (s), and l
N
i (s), solve the profit-maximization prob-
lem of non-tradable-good firms in country i = 1, . . . , I .
3. ρ(s) is such that contingent bonds are in zero net supply.
4. The wage, Wi(s), is such that Pi satisfies Pi = λi/λU , where λi is the multiplier on the (intertempo-
ral) budget constraint for i = 1, . . . , I , and λU the one for i = U .
5. The market for each tradable good, z, clears, cTij(z, s) = qij(z, s), i, j = 1, . . . , I .
6. The market for non-tradable goods clears, cNi (s) = q
N
i (s), i = 1, . . . , I .
7. The labor market clears in each country i = 1 . . . , I ,
Li = l
N
i (s) +
∫ ∞
zimin
lii(z, s)dGi(s) +
I∑
j=1
∫ zmij
zxij
lxij(z, s)dGi(s) +
I∑
j=1
∫ ∞
zmji
lmji (z, s)dGj(s).
8. The productivity cutoffs, zxij and z
m
ij , satisfy the zero-profit conditions for trade and FDI in (12) and
(13), for each i, j = 1 . . . , I .
9. The world resource constraint for the final good is satisfied in the first period, with Fmi and F
x
i given
by (14) and (15),
I∑
i=1
Bi(0) =
I∑
i=1
(Fmi + F
x
i ) .
Characterization of Equilibrium
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In characterizing the equilibrium, it is useful to define the following aggregate productivity in-
dices for domestic, exporting, and multinational firms supplying country i,
Zdii ≡
∫∞
zimin
zη−1dGi (z) , Zxji ≡
∫ zmji
zxji
zη−1dGj(z), and Zmji ≡
∫∞
zmji
zη−1dGj(z). (16)
Since the export and FDI decisions are made before uncertainty is resolved, the productivities of
the marginal exporter and multinational firm, zxij and z
m
ij , do not vary across states. Thus, the
indices Zdii, Z
x
ji, and Z
m
ji are also constant across states. Substituting the firms’ pricing rules into
the tradable good price index, we get
P Ti (s) =
(
η
η − 1
)
Wi(s)Zi(s)
1
1−η , (17)
where
Zi (s) ≡ Zdii +
I∑
j=1
(
τji
Wj(s)
Wi(s)
)1−η
Zxji +
I∑
j=1
Zmji . (18)
Note that, even though Zdii, Z
x
ji, and Z
m
ji are not state-dependent, Zi (s) is state-dependent due
to the imported goods: Shocks to the unit cost of production in foreign countries are transmitted to
the domestic market through the price of imported goods. In particular, lower prices for imported
goods from j increase the productivity index Zi (s). In contrast, since the unit costs of production
for foreign affiliates fluctuate with host-country wages, these affiliates do not transmit shocks to
the production cost across countries.
Higher local wages directly increase the prices of both tradable and non-tradable goods pro-
duced within the country. The overall effect of wages on the price of tradable goods, however,
also includes an indirect effect coming from the productivity index Zi(s): Higher local wages,
Wi(s), make imported goods relatively cheap compared to local tradable goods, and since goods
are substitutes (η > 1), expenditure is reallocated towards cheaper imports, increasing the overall
productivity index, Zi(s).20
In the empirical work that follows, we focus on aggregate quantities. We define net exports in
country i as the usual difference between exports and imports,NXi(s) = EXi(s)−IMi(s). Output
20We assume that the impact of country i’s shock is negligible on country j’s wages, dWj/dAi ≈ 0, and, hence, the
impact on the term representing imported goods in the price index of country j is negligible, dZxi /dWj ≈ 0 (see
equations 17 and 18).
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is related to net exports and consumption by Yi(s) = Pi(s) + NXi(s). The following proposition
summarizes the key aggregate comovements implied by the model.
Proposition 2. Aggregate absorption, Ci(s), the wage, Wi(s), and the price of tradable goods, P Ti (s), in
country i positively comove with output in country i, Yi(s). Net exports in country i, NXi(s), negatively
comoves with output in country i,
C˜i(s) = D2,i(s) Y˜i(s), (19)
W˜i(s) = Y˜i(s), (20)
P˜ Ti (s) = [1−mi(s)] Y˜i(s), (21)
N˜Xi(s) = −D1,i(s) Y˜i(s), (22)
where X˜(s) ≡ d logX(s) are proportional fluctuations in variable X . D1,i(s) and D2,i(s) are positive in
all states of nature s, and
mi(s) ≡
I∑
j=1
(
τji
Wj(s)
Wi(s)
)1−η Zxji
Zi(s)
.
Appendix A presents the proof.
Qualitatively, the comovements between aggregate variables implied by our model are stan-
dard in the international real business cycle literature and consistent with the data. Table 2 reports
the correlations between output and absorption (column 1), net exports (column 2), and wages
(column 3), respectively. In our sample, the average correlation coefficient between real GDP per
capita and absorption, wages, and net exports is,respectively, 0.87, 0.26, and -0.43. The data are
described in detail in subsection 4.1.
3 Trade and Affiliate Sales under Uncertainty
In this section, we analyze the effect of cross-country risk on the firm’s choice between serving a
market through exporting or through opening an affiliate. We begin by analyzing the effect of risk
on the expected profits of a firm that decides to open an affiliate or export to country j.
The value of an affiliate of a firm with productivity z, from country i, located in country j is
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proportional to the expected flow of profits, as shown in (10), and can be expressed as21
V mij (z) = λU
1− α
η
zη−1
∑
s∈S
Pr(s)
(
Wj(s)
P Tj (s)
)1−η
PjCj (s) , (23)
while, from (11), the value of a firm with productivity z, from country i, that exports to j is given
by
V xij (z) = λU
1− α
η
zη−1
∑
s∈S
Pr(s)
[
τij
(
Wi(s)
P Tj (s)
)]1−η
PjCj (s) . (24)
Profits of affiliates and exporters fluctuate with two state-dependent objects: aggregate expen-
diture, or absorption, PjCj(s); and the unit costs of production relative to the price of tradable
goods in the host market: Wj(s)/P Tj (s) for foreign affiliates and Wi(s)/P
T
j (s) for exporters. The
labor cost, relative to the price of tradable goods, summarizes how the price charged by a firm
from country i compares to those charged by its competitors and, therefore, determines the firm’s
market share.
Importantly, the profits of a firm in state s are highest when its unit cost (relative to its com-
petitors’ unit costs) is low and aggregate absorption is high. It is clear from (23) and (24) that
maximizing the expected value of the firm is equivalent to maximizing the expected value of the
product of absorbtion and market share. We can express the expected value of this product in
terms of variances and covariances by taking a second-order Taylor expansion of the value func-
tions in (23) and (24) around their deterministic values,
V̂ mij ≈ (η − 1)
(
−cov
(
C˜j , W˜j − P˜ Tj
)
+
η
2
var
(
W˜j − P˜ Tj
))
, (25)
V̂ xij ≈ (η − 1)
(
−cov
(
C˜j , W˜i − P˜ Tj
)
+
η
2
var
(
W˜i − P˜ Tj
))
, (26)
where X˜(s) ≡ dX(s)/X are fluctuations around the deterministic equilibrium for state-dependent
variables, and X̂ ≡ dX/X are fluctuations around the deterministic equilibrium for non-state-
dependent variables.
Our first result is that both the value of opening an affiliate and the value of exporting for firms
21The Cobb-Douglas assumption in (1) implies that expenditure on the composite tradable good is simply
PTj (s)C
T
j (s) = (1− α)PjCj(s).
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from i serving j depend on the covariance between aggregate absorbtion in j and the unit cost of
production of serving j, relative to its competitors, in market j, as reflected in the first term of the
right-hand side of both (25) and (26). The intuition is simple: Expected profits are higher when
the firm has a (relatively) low cost of production in those states in which demand is high. For
exporters to j, this occurs when the demand for goods in country j, Cj , comoves negatively with
the labor cost in the home country i, relative to the price of tradable goods in j, Wi/P Tj . For a
foreign affiliate in j, this happens when there is a low comovement between demand in j, Cj , and
the labor cost in the host country j, relative to the price of tradable goods in j, Wj/P Tj .
Our second result is that both the value of exporting and opening an affiliate are increasing in
the variance of the relative costs of firms from i serving j, as reflected by the second term of the
right-hand side of both (25) and (26). This is a direct consequence of the convexity of the profit
function in the price charged by the firm, relative to its competitors: More volatility in the firm’s
relative cost increases expected profits.22
Since aggregate output Yi is proportional to the unit cost of production Wi, we can express
(25) and (26) in terms of output fluctuations (GDP), which are more reliably measured for a large
group of countries. Combining (19), (20), and (25), fluctuations in the value of an affiliate from i
in j can be expressed as
V̂ mij ≈ (η − 1)mj
(η
2
mj −D2,j
)
var
(
Y˜j
)
. (27)
Similarly, combining (19), (20), and (26), fluctuations in the value of exporting from i to j can be
expressed as
V̂ xij ≈− (η − 1)
(
D2,j + η(1−mj)
)
cov
(
Y˜i, Y˜j
)
(28)
+ (η − 1)
(η
2
var
(
Y˜i
)
+ (1−mj)
(
D2,j +
η
2
(1−mj)
)
var
(
Y˜j
))
.
Derivations of (27) and (28) are presented in appendix A.
22This is a standard result in the finance literature that can be found in Abel (1983), among others.
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3.1 Aggregate Implications
In this section, we derive the testable implications of the model. We calculate the aggregate ratio
of exports to affiliate sales from country i to j, the observable variable in our data, and show its
relationship with cross-country business cycle comovements. We test these predictions in the next
section.
The ratio of (aggregate) exports to affiliate sales from country i to j, in state s, is
Rij(s) ≡
Xxij(s)
Xmij (s)
=
(
τij
Wi(s)
Wj(s)
)1−η Zxij
Zmij
, (29)
where Xxij (s) =
∫ zmij
zxij
pxij(z, s)q
x
ij(z, s)dGi(z) and X
m
ij (s) =
∫∞
zmij
pmij (z, s)q
m
ij (z, s)dGi(z), as given by
the familiar expressions for expenditure derived from CES preferences.
We assume that the distribution of firm productivity is Pareto, Gi (z) = 1− z−κ, where κ is the
shape parameter, and z ∈ [1,∞). We make two standard assumptions that are necessary in this
class of models. First, we assume that κ > 2, which is necessary for the productivity distribution
to be finite. Second, we assume that κ+ 1− η > 0, which is necessary for the distribution of firm
sales to have a finite mean.23
Define the relative productivity indices to be zij ≡ zxij/zmij and Zij ≡ Zxij/Zmij . With the Pareto
assumption,
Zij = z
−(κ+1−η)
ij − 1. (30)
It is clear from (29) and (30) that an increase in the number of exporting firms relative to multinationals—
a lower zij—increases the flow of exports relative to affiliate sales.
From the free-entry conditions in (12) and (13) and the expressions for the value of an exporter
and value of an affiliate in (23) and (24), the ratio of productivities of the marginal exporter relative
to the marginal foreign affiliate is
zη−1ij =
(
fij
1− fij
)
Es
[
Cj
(
Wj
PTj
)1−η]
τ1−ηij Es
[
Cj
(
Wi
PTj
)1−η] − 1
 , (31)
23The firm sales’ distribution is Pareto with shape parameter κ+ 1− η.
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where fij ≡ fxij/fmij and Es(X) ≡
∑
s Pr(s)X(s).
Replacing (31) in (30), and further back into (29), we show in appendix A that the ratio of
exports to affiliates sales in state s can be expressed as
logRij(s) ≈ logRij + (η − 1)
[
mj Y˜j(s)−miY˜i(s)
]
(32)
− Φ1ijcov
(
Y˜j , Y˜i
)
+ Φ
2
ijvar
(
Y˜j
)
+ Φ
3
ijvar
(
Y˜i
)
,
where Φ1ij and Φ
3
ij are positive constants and Φ
2
ij is positive as long as the (deterministic) share of
imported goods in the domestic tradable price index, mj , is less than one-half. This expression is
the basis of our empirical analysis in section 4. The variable Rij is the ratio of exports to affiliate
sales from i to j in the deterministic equilibrium,
Rij =
(
τij
W i
W j
)1−η( fij
1− fij
[(
τij
W i
W j
)η−1
− 1
])− κ
η−1+1
− 1
 . (33)
This expression embodies the proximity-concentration tradeoff in a deterministic environ-
ment: The ratio of exports to affiliate sales decreases with the transportation cost between the
countries and with the relative average labor cost. Lower unit costs of exporting, W i, relative
to using an affiliate, W j , result in a larger fraction of firms from i that chooses to export rather
than opening affiliates to serve country j. Lower values of τij or fij have similar impacts on the
marginal exporter and marginal multinational firm.
Besides the factors embedded inRij , the ratio of exports to affiliate sales from i to j is a function
of the cross-country output process and state s realizations. The second term on the right-hand
side of (32) affects the relative importance of exports through the intensive margin. In states in
which country i’s cost of production increases relative to j, affiliates will expand production and
exporters will contract production, so affiliate sales relative to exports will increase. The vari-
ance and covariance terms work through the extensive margin: As we have discussed above, the
second-order moments of the output process affect how many exporters and how many foreign
affiliates sell to j.
For exposition, we have derived the implications of the model assuming only one tradable-
good industry. In appendix B, we characterize the equilibrium of a model identical to the one
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presented here, but with many tradable-good industries which differ in their elasticities of sub-
stitution between varieties (η), their shares in aggregate expenditures (α), and the Pareto-shape
parameter (κ). The multi-industry model produces an equation analogous to the one in (32), but
where the variable of interest is the ratio of exports to affiliate sales from country i to country j in
industry h, and the coefficients are industry-country-pair specific. It is the multi-industry version
of (32) that we will take to the data.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we look for evidence supporting the model’s implications found in equation (32).
4.1 Data
We use data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to construct affiliate sales by industry
and country and data from Feenstra et al. (2002) to construct exports by industry and country.
We take as our country sample the “wide” sample used in Helpman et al. (2004) that contains 38
countries that traded and engaged in FDI with the United States. We restrict our analysis to the
BEA survey benchmark years 1994, 1999, and 2004, as these years have the widest coverage of
companies and more detailed surveys. In the baseline case, we pool the three cross-sections; in
section 5, we explore different country samples and time periods.
Our country-industry measure of affiliate sales is constructed from the confidential firm-level
data collected by the BEA. The BEA uses the International Surveys Industry (ISI) system to classify
the operations of multinationals and their affiliates. The ISI classification system used in 1994 and
1999 is based on the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), and a three-digit ISI industry
is roughly equivalent to a three-digit SIC industry. Our data on exports are from Feenstra et
al. (2002), who construct SIC-based measures of trade flows from Harmonized System data. To
match the affiliate sales data classification, we create a concordance between the SIC and the ISI,
based on Mataloni (1995), which can be found in table 12 in the appendix. For the 2004 survey,
the ISI classification system used is based on the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS), so we have created a concordance between the NAICS-based ISI and the SIC-based ISI.
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In all of our specifications, we restrict our analysis to manufacturing industries.
The BEA collects data on affiliate sales by destination—to the local market, to the United States,
and to third countries—as well as by type of relationship—to affiliated and to unaffiliated par-
ties.24 To be consistent with our model, our affiliate sales measure includes only sales to local
unaffiliated parties. Table 1 reports the share of total affiliate sales that satisfy these criteria, by
country of destination.
Additionally, in our model, exporting is at arm’s length: There are no shipments of goods from
parents to affiliates or from affiliates to parents (i.e., intra-firm trade). To better align our measure-
ments in the data with the ones in the model, we would like to remove both shipments from U.S.
parents to their foreign affiliates, and shipments from foreign affiliates in the United States to their
foreign parents, from total U.S. exports. The BEA data allows us to preclude the former: we re-
move from total U.S. exports the exports from U.S. parents to their affiliates. Unfortunately, we do
not observe in the BEA data the exports of foreign-owned affiliates operating in the United States,
so these exports are still in our measure of exports.25 The Bureau of the Census, however, does
report arm’s-length trade at the country-industry level. These data are not publicly available at
the country-industry level for 1994 and 1999, but they are available for 2004. We show in section
5.3 that for the year in which we can completely purge the export data of intra-firm trade, our
results are unchanged. Columns 4 to 6 in table 3 report the ratio of exports to affiliate sales for
2004, cleaned of all intra-firm trade.
In our baseline case, we drop observations in which affiliate sales and/or exports are zero.
Of the 5, 928 possible combinations among 38 destination country, 52 industries, and 3 years, the
sample has 3,625 valid industry-country-time observations. In section 5, we analyze the potential
selection bias of our baseline estimation. Columns 1 to 3 in table 3 present the descriptive statistics.
The average ratio of exports to affiliate sales in our sample is 0.70 (in logs -0.363), with important
differences across countries: The average ratio of exports to affiliate sales across industries ranges
from 0.13 (-2.04 in logs) in the case of Greece to 4.63 (1.53 in logs) in the case of Singapore.
24Notice that, while we have firm-level data on affiliate sales for multinational companies, we do not have firm-level
data for non-multinational firms located in the United States—they are not in the BEA data set. That means that we
do not have firm-level data on exporters, and cannot perform our analysis at the firm level.
25This is also true in Helpman et al. (2004). While the BEA does survey the affiliates of foreign companies that operate
in the United States, the benchmark years for this survey are not the same as the benchmark years for U.S.-owned
foreign affiliates that we use.
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We measure output as real GDP per capita at constant prices, PPP adjusted, from the Penn
World Tables 7.1 (“RGDPL”). Our model is stationary, so the GDP fluctuations in our model are
interpreted as fluctuations around a deterministic trend. Correspondingly, we detrend the (log)
GDP series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100. We compute the
variance of output for all of the countries in the sample, as well as their covariance with respect to
U.S. output, for the period 1970–2004. Table 4 reports the variances of GDP fluctuations and the
covariances with those of the United States, for all of the countries in our sample.
In the robustness section, we also estimate a specification based on the covariance between ab-
sorption in the host country and the U.S. unit cost of production, and the variance of the unit cost
of production in the destination country. Absorption is constructed as GDP minus net exports, in
local currencies, from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database, deflated by the corre-
sponding GDP deflator. As a measure of the unit cost of production, we use the compensation per
employee in the manufacturing sector denominated in current PPP-adjusted U.S. dollars, from
the OECD STAN database, deflated by the U.S. consumer price index, from the WDI.26 This wage
series is available only for a subset of (mostly OECD) countries. The covariance and variance are
computed after the data are detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, for the period 1970–2004.
Table 4 reports these variables for the countries in our sample.
As can be seen in (33), the ratio of exports to affiliate sales to country j in the deterministic
environment, Rhj , is part of our empirical specification. As in Helpman et al. (2004), we combine
measures of distance from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et Informations Internationales (CEPII),
tariffs, and freight charges as proxies for τhij . These variables measure the variable costs of export-
ing from the United States into country j, in industry h, in 1999.27 We also include the level of real
GDP per capita and, in some specifications, the level of real GDP (PPP-adjusted), in the destina-
tion country, from the Penn World Tables 7.1; a common language indicator and a common border
indicator, from (CEPII); the average number of years of schooling, from Barro and Lee (2000); and
an index of risk of expropriation, from Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh (2001). All these
variables are average values over 1990–2000. These control variables are summarized in table 5.
26Notice that the unit cost of production in the model is expressed in units of the numeraire, which corresponds to
constant U.S. dollars in the data.
27We are very grateful to Stephen Yeaple, who provided us with these data.
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4.2 Results
Our baseline specification is equation (32) with the origin country restricted to being the United
States. Allowing for an additive error term, we estimate the following equation for flows of in-
dustry h from the United States to destination j in the benchmark year t = {1994, 1999, 2004},
logRhjt = logR
h
j + β1cov
(
Y˜u, Y˜j
)
+ β2var
(
Y˜j
)
+ εhjt. (34)
The error term collects errors in measurement and the deviations in output from their mean values,
which are present in the term mj Y˜j(s) − muY˜u(s) in (32). Note that the expectation over output
deviations is equal to zero. Our model predicts β1 to be negative and β2 to be positive. We estimate
these parameters with ordinary least squares (OLS). The ratio of exports to affiliate sales under
certainty, Rhj , derived in (33) is specified as
logR
h
j = α0Dh + α1
yj
yu
+ α2τ
h
j , (35)
where yj/yu is GDP per capita in country j, relative to the United States, and the transport cost,
τhj , is proxied by distance to country j, tariffs, and freight costs applied to goods coming from the
United States into country j in industry h.28 To control for industry characteristics, we also include
a set of industry fixed effects, Dh. The baseline specification includes as explanatory variables all
those factors that, according to our model, determine the ratio of exports to affiliate sales under
certainty. In section 5, we include, for robustness, additional country-level controls commonly
cited in the gravity literature. Notice that the industry fixed effects fully account for industry
characteristics typically found to influence the proximity-concentration tradeoff, such as the het-
erogeneity of firm-level productivity within an industry, as studied in Helpman et al. (2004).
Country-level Estimates
Before moving to the industry-level specifications, we first take a first look at the data by esti-
mating an aggregated, country-level specification of (34). We take as the dependent variable total
exports from the United States to country j divided by total U.S. foreign affiliate sales to local
unaffiliated parties in j. In the country-level version of (35), we drop the industry fixed effects
28Notice that output per capita in the model, yi ≡ Y i/Li is derived directly from (38) in appendix A.
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and use freight costs and tariff rates that are averages across industries. In column 1 of table 6, we
report the country-level estimates. The predictions of our model are borne out in this table. The
coefficient on the covariance of output fluctuations is negative and the coefficient on the variance
of output is positive, as our model suggests. A firm is more likely to export to countries whose
business cycle comoves negatively and to countries with more-volatile business cycles.
The coefficients in column 1 are also consistent with the results from the literature on the
proximity-concentration tradeoff in deterministic environments. This literature focuses on the
tradeoff between the marginal costs associated with exporting and the size of the destination mar-
ket. It finds that higher marginal costs of exporting should be served less by exports, relative to
affiliate sales. As reported in columns 1 and 2, we find that tariff rates—the marginal costs of
exporting—are negatively related to the export-affiliate-sales ratio.
Industry-country-level Estimates
Table 6 reports the coefficients from the regression specified in (34), where the data are pooled
across the three benchmark surveys. The results in column 3 correspond to the baseline sample of
38 countries, which includes both developed and developing economies. The dependent variable
is the ratio of exports to affiliate sales, in industry h, to country j, for the years 1994, 1999, and
2004. Industries are defined at the three-digit ISI classification, which contains 52 industries. The
results in column 5 correspond to the same specification but uses as the dependent variable the
average ratio of exports to affiliate sales across the three benchmark years. In all of the industry-
level regressions, we two-way cluster the standard errors by industry and country and add either
year or year-industry fixed effects.
The estimates reported in columns 3 and 5 support the predictions of the theory regarding
the relationship between flows from the United States and the stochastic properties of country
j’s business cycles. The United States serves more-volatile destinations more through exports
than through affiliate sales: The coefficient on var(Y˜j) is positive and significant. Consistent with
the model’s predictions, the United States has more exports, relative to affiliate sales, to markets
that are less correlated with the U.S. business cycle: The coefficient on cov(Y˜u, Y˜j) is negative and
statistically significant.
To see the economic significance of the estimated coefficients, table 7 reports the beta coef-
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ficients associated with the coefficients in columns 3 and 5 of table 6.29 The beta coefficient as-
sociated with the coefficient on cov(Y˜u, Y˜j) implies that an increase of one standard deviation in
the output comovement between country j and the United States reduces the ratio of exports to
affiliate sales from the United States to country j by about 0.17 standard deviations. The effect
of country j’s output volatility on the ratio of exports to affiliates sales from the United States to
that country is similar: An increase of one standard deviation in var(Y˜j) increases the (log) ratio
of exports to affiliate sales by 0.10 standard deviations. These effects are significant and greater in
magnitude than the effect of tariffs on the exports-to-affiliate-sales ratio: An increase of one stan-
dard deviation in the tariff rate applied to exports in industry h to country j implies a decrease in
exports, relative to affiliate sales, of about 0.04 standard deviations.
To further place our results in perspective, consider the impact of increasing the output covari-
ance of the 50th percentile country (Spain) to that of the 75th percentile country (Ireland). Doing
so decreases the ratio of exports to affiliates sales by 26 percent, from an average of 0.23 to 0.30.
Analogously, increasing the output volatility of the 25th percentile country (Switzerland) to the 75
percentile country (Finland) increases the ratio of exports to affiliate sales by 40 percent, from an
average of 1.17 to 1.64.
Further Evidence
In this section, we exploit the theoretical implications of the model to derive additional empirical
predictions concerning the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the effect of macro-comovements on
the ratio of exports to affiliate sales. In particular, we show analytically how the coefficients on
cov(Y˜j , Y˜u) and var(Y˜j) are predicted to vary across industry and country characteristics. We find
that the data support these predictions, providing further evidence that the mechanisms in our
model are consistent with the empirical facts.
We show in appendix A that the coefficients corresponding to cov(Y˜j , Y˜u) and var(Y˜j) are,
Φ1hij = Φ
h
ij
[
D2,j + η(1−mj)
]
> 0
Φ2hij = Φ
h
ij
[
D2,j + η(1− 2mj)
]
> 0
29A beta coefficient converts the regression coefficients into units of sample standard deviations. It is calculated as the
product of the estimated coefficient times the standard deviation of the corresponding independent variable, divided
by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
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where
Φhij ≡ (κh + 1− ηh)φij
1−( fhij
1− fhij
1
φij − 1
)κh+1−ηh−1 .
From (19), D2,j is the ratio of absorption to GDP and, from (2), mj is the share of imports in
consumption. Thus, the coefficients on cov(Y˜j , Y˜u) and var(Y˜j), β1 = −Φ1hij and β2 = Φ2hij , increase
in absolute value for countries with higher ratios of absorption to GDP, and decrease for those
with higher import shares.
Columns 2 and 3 in table 8 present the results of (34) with a full set of country controls and
these additional two interaction terms, respectively. Consistent with the theory, the interaction
between the import share, mj , and the covariance in column 2 term is positive, which reduces
the absolute value of the corresponding coefficient. The interaction is, however, not statistically
significant for the variance term. The results in column 3 are stronger: The interaction with the
ratio of absorption to GDP in country j, Absj , increases the absolute value of the coefficient for
both the covariance and the variance.
Finally, the absolute values of our coefficients of interest should be larger for industry-country
observations for which the coefficient Φhij is larger. This coefficient increases in the relative fixed
cost of exporting to opening an affiliate, fhij = f
xh
ij /f
mh
ij . We follow Helpman et al. (2004) and
use, as an industry index of economies of scale at the plant level, the share of non-production
employees in total employment, for each industry in the United States, non.prodh. All the com-
mon elements of the fixed costs of exporting and FDI are subsumed in the industry fixed effect;
the share of non-production workers proxies for any remaining costs associated with FDI. We
expect the coefficients to be larger (in absolute values) for those industries with lower shares of
non-production workers, non.prodh.30 The results in column 4, table 8, are consistent with this
prediction.
5 Robustness
To explore the robustness of our results, we add additional controls to our baseline regression
and check the sensitivity of our findings to different samples of countries and time periods. We
30Summary statistics of Absj , mj , and non.prodh are in table 5.
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also analyze the merits of potential alternative hypotheses that could result in predictions that
are observationally equivalent to ours, and explore reverse causality arguments as well as the
potential selection bias that results from dropping those country-industry observations with no
exports or multinational sales from the United States.
5.1 Additional Country-Specific Determinants of FDI and Trade
The model in section 2 highlights the role of country-specific risk in the firm’s choice between FDI
and trade, but it is admittedly simple in the treatment of potential factors influencing this decision
under certainty. In this section, we add several country characteristics that have been shown to be
important in deterministic models of international trade.
In our model, the size of a country does not influence the firm’s choice of location. Different
modeling assumptions, however, could lead to a dependence on country size. If, for example,
the productivity distribution of firms is not Pareto, or if firm pricing does not admit constant
markups, size could influence the choice of production location. Another concern regards the
destination country’s legal structure. Countries with high output volatility may also have higher
expropriation risk, which is a fundamental factor affecting the decisions of the firm and, in this
context in particular, the decision regarding exporting or opening an affiliate.
We therefore check the robustness of our results to country size by including the destination
country’s GDP, and to legal institutions by including a measure of expropriation risk. In addition,
we include a measure of human capital to control for differences in production costs that may not
be captured by GDP per capita.31
Columns 2, 4, and 6 in table 6 correspond to the specification in (34) augmented with an ex-
panded set of controls for the explanatory variables of the deterministic exports-to-affiliate-sales
ratio in (35). Columns 2 and 4 report the results of a pooled regression where the dependent vari-
able is aggregated at the country level in column 2, and where the dependent variable is disaggre-
gated by country-industry in column 4. In column 6, the dependent variable is the average ratio
of exports to affiliate sales across the three benchmark years, by country-industry. The additional
31In results not reported here, we also checked for sensitivity to measures of the quality of the legal system as a whole
and to capital output ratios. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these variables, though some combinations of
variables are highly co-linear.
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controls are: the size of the host market (log Y ); the level of human capital (schooling); a measure of
expropriation risk (expr.risk); and binary variables that measure other potential determinants of
export costs—if the countries share a common language (com.lang) or a common border (border),
or if the destination country is landlocked (landlock). These additional controls improve the fit
of the regression, but the coefficients regarding the variation in cross-country output are largely
unchanged.
5.2 Time Periods and Country Samples
We estimate the coefficients in (34) using data for the three benchmark years separately. The
estimates, reported in columns 1-6 of table 9, confirm that the results are similar over time and
are not driven by an outlier year. The invariance of our results to time period is not surprising;
the cross-country patterns of trade and affiliate sales are very persistent. We also verified (non-
reported) that these results are robust to changes in the time-frame used to compute the cross-
country comovements.32
A potential source of concern with our estimates is the inclusion of several developing coun-
tries whose business cycles are more volatile. Table 10 reports the results of estimating (34) for
OECD and non-OECD countries, separately.33 The point estimates are, again, qualitatively con-
sistent with the predictions of the model, although, given the drop in the number of observations,
their significance varies with the specification. Overall, the results are robust to different time
periods and country samples.
5.3 U.S. Exports to Related Parties
Our theoretical framework models a firm’s choice between exporting and opening an affiliate as
alternative ways of supplying a destination market. To be consistent with the model, our measure
of affiliate sales includes only sales to local unrelated parties. Analogously, our measure of exports
should include only exports to unaffiliated parties—so called “arm’s-length trade.” Using data
32The results are qualitatively unchanged if cov(Y˜j , Y˜u) and var(Y˜j) are computed based on the period 1985-2004 (The
Great Moderation) and on the periods 1970-2010 and 1990-2010, which include the Great Recession. The results of these
estimations are available upon request.
33Our sample includes the entire OECD as of 1999, with the exception of Iceland, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Poland.
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from the BEA, we are able to remove from total exports the exports of U.S. parents to their affiliates,
but we cannot remove (because we cannot observe) intra-firm exports from affiliates of foreign
parents operating in the United States, which could potentially influence our findings.
We explore the robustness of our findings by using trade data collected by the U.S. Census Bu-
reau that differentiates between related party trade and arm’s-length trade. Unfortunately, these
data are available, at the industry-country level, only for 2004 and not for 1994 and 1999. For 2004,
we estimate (34) two ways. First, we use our baseline measure of exports, from which we have
eliminated U.S. parent-to-affiliate exports, and second, we use the Census data to restrict exports
to only those conducted at arm’s-length.
Columns 7 and 8 of table 9 report the results using the measure of U.S. exports that includes
only arm’s-length trade from Census in the computation of the ratio of exports to affiliate sales. For
comparison, columns 6 and 7 report the results of the same estimation using our baseline measure
of exports. The point estimates in the two cases are consistent with the model’s predictions, and
quite similar across the two specifications. It seems that removing the exports due to the U.S.
parent is enough to take care of most of the intra-firm trade.
5.4 Selection Bias
Our estimates are based on a sample of country-industry observations for which both exports
and multinational sales by U.S. firms are positive. This is consistent with our theory: Under
assumption 1 and a Pareto distribution of firms’ productivities, there is always a positive number
of firms exporting and opening affiliates in every country and industry.34 This is not true in the
data: Of the 5,928 country-industry-year potential combinations in our sample of 38 countries and
52 industries, 44 percent correspond to country-industry-year observations for which either, or
both, export and affiliate sales are zeros. If the sample in which we observe a positive export-to-
affiliate-sales ratio has different characteristics than the universe, our estimation would be biased.
This potential selection bias necessarily disappears for groups of country-industry pairs whose
characteristics are such that practically all of them exhibit positive exports and affiliate sales. This
is the principle behind the identification-at-infinity method proposed by Chamberlain (1986) and
34These assumptions are common in the proximity-tradeoff literature under certainty.
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Heckman (1990), and applied by Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). In our case, the baseline regres-
sion (34) should be estimated using a sample selected on observed characteristics that predict that
nearly all of the country-industry pairs in the sample have positive export-to-affiliate-sales ratios.
This method has an important advantage over the traditional Heckman (1979) two-step selection
correction, in that it does not require an exclusion restriction, i.e., a variable that affects partici-
pation without affecting the magnitude of the export-to-affiliate-sales ratio. A potential problem
with this method is that it involves a tradeoff between sample size and the amount of selection
bias. The sample whose probability of observation is near one needs to be large enough to be use-
ful. Gravity-type regressions in international trade easily satisfy this criteria because they have a
sufficiently large number of country-industry pairs for which the probability of observing positive
flows is close to one, e.g., the OECD countries.
To check for selection bias, we follow Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) and estimate a Pro-
bit equation in which the unit of observation is the country-industry-year pair. The dependent
variable is one if both trade and affiliate sales for the observation are positive, and zero other-
wise. The estimated probability that an observation is positive is P̂ (Rhjt > 0|X), where X is the
extended set of country and industry controls explained in section 5.1. Based on this Probit esti-
mation, we define groups of country-industry-year pairs to be included in the OLS regressions:{
j, h, t | P̂ (Rhjt > 0|X) ≥ α
}
for α = 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95. The group defined by α = 0 cor-
responds to the full-sample used in column 4 of table 6. The amount of selection bias falls as we
restrict the sample to those country-industry-year pairs for which the probability α approaches to
one.
Table 11 shows that there is selection bias in our estimation. For output volatility, the selec-
tion bias works against finding our result: the coefficient increases, and remains significant as our
sample converges to the one with the least amount of selection. The covariance of output fluc-
tuations across countries, however, is a more important predictor of the exports to affiliate sales
ratio for the sample of countries that are less likely to register positive exports or FDI flows. Most
importantly, in all cases, our coefficients of interest have the sign predicted by the theory and re-
main significant for the smallest group of country-industry-year pairs for which the probability of
observing positive exports and affiliate sales is 0.95. So while there is some selection bias in our
estimation, it either works against finding our result, or it is not strong enough to overturn our
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findings.
5.5 Reverse Causality
In this subsection, we evaluate the presence of reverse causality that could link the importance
of foreign affiliates to cross-country comovement. The setup of the model described in section
2 assumes that country shocks are not transmitted through the activity of U.S. affiliates. In our
model, affiliates are assumed to use labor from the host country and are, therefore, not affected
by shocks to the source country’s labor cost. One can imagine, however, an alternative setup in
which shocks to the parent firm in the home country are transmitted to affiliates. Then, in general
equilibrium, the presence of foreign affiliates would make the business cycles of the respective
economies more correlated.
Under this alternative hypothesis, U.S. affiliates would be the ones driving the economy-wide
wage and output fluctuations. This seems hardly plausible given the small presence of U.S. affil-
iates in total employment in our sample of countries. On average, U.S. affiliates account for 2.2
percent of the destination country’s employment, and this figure is even lower (1.2 percent) when
we restrict employment to our sample of U.S. affiliates in manufacturing (see table 1, columns 2
and 3). Even so, we quantitatively explore the potential effect of U.S. affiliates on the cross-country
output correlation by estimating (34) including an extra term, Ej , that corresponds to the share of
U.S. affiliate employment in total host-country employment, interacted with cov(Y˜j , Y˜u). The re-
sults for the pooled regression is in table 8, column 1. The interaction term, Ej × cov(Y˜j , Y˜u), is
positive: The effect of the cross-country covariance on the export-affiliate-sales ratio decreases (is
less negative) for countries in which U.S. affiliates account for a larger share of local employment.
This is the opposite of what we would expect if affiliates drove the host country’s business cycle.
Most importantly, our coefficients of interest are hardly changed by this exercise: The ratio of ex-
ports to affiliate sales is higher towards economies with more volatile and less correlated output,
and the magnitudes are not much different from the baseline results reported in table 6.35
35Note that an analogous reverse causality argument for exports cannot explain the empirical results documented here.
Since exports are produced with labor from the source country, trade flows do transmit source country shocks to des-
tination markets, increasing the synchronization of business cycles. So greater trade flows should bias the coefficient
on cov(Y˜j , Y˜u) towards zero, working against us finding a negative coefficient.
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5.6 Alternative Specification
The empirical prediction tested in the baseline regression in (34) is derived using the business cycle
comovements implied by the model, by which fluctuations in the expected (discounted) profits of
exporting and opening affiliates can be expressed in terms of GDP fluctuations. Moreover, we base
our empirical exercise on the prediction in terms of GDP per capita because data for that variable
are available for, and comparable across, a larger set of countries. In this section, we estimate a
specification of the main predictions of our model that uses directly the unit cost of production
and absorption, abstracting from the proportionality implied by the model between fluctuations
in output and fluctuations in absorption and unit costs of production.
Using (25) and (26), we show in appendix A that, analogous to (32), the ratio of exports to
affiliate sales in state s can be expressed as
logRij(s) ≈ logRij + (η − 1)
[
mjW˜j(s)−miW˜i(s)
]
(36)
−Ψ1ijcov
(
C˜j , W˜i
)
+ Ψ
2
ijvar
(
W˜j
)
+ Ψ
3
ijvar
(
W˜i
)
,
where Ψ1ij , Ψ
2
ij , and Ψ
3
ij are positive constants, and Rij is defined as in (33).
Based on this expression, we estimate the following equation for flows of industry h from the
United States to destination j at time t,
logRhjt = logR
h
j + β1cov(C˜j , W˜u) + β2var(W˜j) + 
h
jt, (37)
where the ratio of exports to affiliate sales in the deterministic case (logRhj ) is proxied by the same
variables as for the baseline case. Our model predicts β1 to be negative and β2 to be positive.
In table 8 we test this prediction using data on the compensation per employee variable from
the OECD STAN database.36 Unfortunately, this variable is only available for a sub-sample of
(mostly OECD) countries. Column 5 shows result for the pooled sample where t = {1994, 1999, 2004}.
Overall, the results validate the model’s prediction, although their level of significance varies as
36Compensation per employee is the appropriate measure of our variable Wi because, even though our model ab-
stracts from other costs of production besides labor, this factor is inherently specific to the production location, a key
assumption of our set-up. Other factors are less likely to be sourced in the location of production.
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the number of observations is significantly reduced.37
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes how country-specific risk affects a firm’s choice of serving a foreign market
by exporting or by opening a foreign affiliate. We find that cross-country risk patterns affect the
firm’s decision over the location of production and, thus, the patterns of trade flows and affiliate
sales across countries. Everything else equal, firms prefer to face a lower cost of production in
those states of nature in which demand for their goods is relatively high. This profit-maximizing
behavior results in a sharp empirical prediction: Country pairs with less-correlated business cycles
have larger bilateral trade flows, relative to affiliate sales. Moreover, exporters can better exploit
the volatility of the relative cost of production between the source and the host country. This
implies that exports, rather than affiliate sales, flow towards countries with more-volatile output.
The empirical evidence uncovered in this paper is consistent with these predictions. The
stochastic properties of cross-country shocks are, indeed, important in explaining the joint pat-
tern of the location of affiliates and trade flows.
37The loss of significance in the covariance term is due to an outlier in the wage data, Japan. The correlation between its
GDP and that of the United States is 0.3, but the correlation between absorption in Japan and real wages in the United
States is -0.43. No other country exhibits such an extreme change in the two statistics.
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A Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Proposition 1.
Prices pmij (z, s) and p
x
ij (z, s) are inversely related to the firm’s productivity z. With η > 1, profits
increase in z,
∂
∂z
pikij(z, s) > 0,
for k = x,m, and for all s. For large enough τij such that assumption 1 in subsection 2.2 is satisfied,
multinational profits increase with z relatively more than export profits
∂
∂z
pimij (z, s)−
∂
∂z
pixij(z, s) > 0.
Hence, there exists a productivity level zxij such that V
x
ij
(
zxij
)
− fxij = 0 and for all firms with
productivity z > zxij , the condition V
x
ij (z) > f
x
ij holds. Analogously, if τij is high enough so that
there is a productivity level zmij such that V
m
ij
(
zmij
)
− V xij
(
zmij
)
= fmij − fxij , then for all z > zmij , the
condition V mij (z)− V xij (z) > fmij − fxij holds. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Combining the market clearing conditions for intermediate goods with the one for labor, and
solving for the labor demanded in each sector, total wages in country i can be expressed as
LiWi(s) =
η − 1
η
Yi(s). (38)
Payments to labor are proportional to output, Yi = PiCi(s) + NXi(s). Aggregate absorption is
PiCi(s), and the value of net exports is defined asNXi(s) ≡ EXi(s)−IMi(s). Notice that the final
good price index is constant across states of nature, Pi(s) = Pi.
Define X˜(s) ≡ d logX(s). Totally differentiating (38) yields (20),
W˜i(s) = Y˜i(s). (39)
From (17), we have
P˜ Ti (s) = W˜i(s)− (η − 1)−1Z˜i(s). (40)
Assuming that dWj(s)/dAi(s) ≈ 0, and totally differentiating Zi(s) in (18), yield
Z˜i(s) = (η − 1)mi(s)W˜i(s), (41)
where mi(s) is the share of imports in the price index for tradable goods,
mi(s) ≡
I∑
j=1
(
τji
Wj(s)
Wi(s)
)1−η Zxji
Zi(s)
. (42)
Replacing (41) in (40) yields
P˜ T i(s) = [1−mi(s)] W˜i(s). (43)
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Further using (39), we obtain (21).
Since the final good price index is constant, P˜i = 0, and together with Yi(s) = PiCi(s)+NXi(s),
implies that
C˜i(s) =
dYi(s)− dNXi(s)
Yi(s)−NXi(s) . (44)
where NXi(s) ≡ EXi(s)− IMi(s) with
EXi(s) ≡
∑
j
Xxij = (1− α)
I∑
j=1
(
τij
Wi(s)
Wj(s)
)1−η Zxij
Zj(s)
PjCj(s), (45)
IMi(s) ≡
∑
j
Xxji = (1− α)
I∑
j=1
(
τji
Wj(s)
Wi(s)
)1−η Zxji
Zi(s)
PiCi(s). (46)
Fully differentiating NXi(s) leads to
dNXi(s) = −(η − 1)W˜i(s) [EXi(s) + IMi(s)(1−mi(s))]− IMi(s)C˜i(s).
Equations (22) and (19) follow from combining the expressions above with (39) and (44)
N˜Xi(s) = −D1,i(s)Y˜i(s),
C˜i(s) = D2,i(s)Y˜i(s),
where
D1,i(s) ≡
[
(η − 1)EXi(s) + IMi(s)(1−mi(s))
Yi(s)− EXi(s)
Ci(s)
Yi(s)
+
IMi(s)
Yi(s)− EXi(s)
]
Yi(s)
NXi(s)
,
D2,i(s) ≡
[
Yi(s) + (η − 1) [EXi(s) + IMi(s)(1−mi(s))]
Yi(s)− EXi(s)
]
.
Derivation of Equations (25) and (26)
In a deterministic environment, the values of opening an affiliate or exporting in (23) and (24),re-
spectively, are simply
V
m
ij (z) = λU
1− α
η
zη−1
(
W j
P
T
j
)1−η
P jCj ,
V
x
ij (z) = λU
1− α
η
zη−1τ1−ηij
(
W i
P
T
j
)1−η
P jCj ,
where overlined variables denote their values in the deterministic equilibrium. A second-order
approximation of (23) around the deterministic values yields
V mij (z) ≈ V mij (z) + V mij (z)
(
Es[C˜j ] + (1− η)Es[W˜j − P˜ Tj ]
)
+ V
m
ij (z) (η − 1)
(
Es[(W˜j − P˜ Tj )C˜j ]−
η
2
Es[(W˜j − P˜ Tj )2]
)
,
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where Es(X) ≡
∑
s∈S Pr(s)X(s). Since Es(C˜j) = Es(W˜j) = Es(P˜
T
j ) = 0, only the second-order
terms survive,
V mij (z) ≈ V mij (z) + V mij (z) (η − 1)
(
−Es[(W˜j − P˜ Tj )C˜j ] +
η
2
Es[(W˜j − P˜ Tj )2]
)
.
Applying an analogous procedure for V xij (z) yields
V xij (z) ≈ V xij(z) + V xij(z) (η − 1)
(
−Es[(W˜i − P˜ Tj )C˜j ] +
η
2
Es[(W˜i − P˜ Tj )2]
)
,
Further algebra on the second terms yields, respectively,
V mij (z) ≈ V mij (z) + (η − 1)V mij (z)
(
−cov
[
C˜j , (W˜j − P˜ Tj )
]
+
η
2
var
[
W˜j − P˜ Tj
])
,
V xij (z) ≈ V xij(z) + (η − 1)V xij(z)
(
−cov
[
C˜j , W˜i − P˜ Tj
]
+
η
2
var
[
W˜i − P˜ Tj
])
.
After rearranging terms, we get (25) and (26) in the paper.
Derivation of Equations (32) and (33)
The ratio of exports to affiliate sales from country i to j in the deterministic equilibrium is
obtained by evaluating (29) at its deterministic values,
Rij =
(
τij
W i
W j
)1−η
Zij . (47)
Assuming that firm’s productivity is distributed Pareto,
Rij =
(
τij
W i
W j
)1−η (
z
−(κ+1−η)
ij − 1
)
, (48)
where
zη−1ij =
(
fij
1− fij
)([
W j
τijW i
]1−η
− 1
)
. (49)
The combination of the expressions above results in (33) in the paper.
A first-order Taylor approximation of the ratio of exports to sales by affiliates from country i
in j in (29) around its deterministic value in equation (33) yields
R˜ij(s) = (η − 1)
(
mj Y˜j(s)−miY˜i(s)
)
+ Ẑij ,
while a first-order Taylor approximation of the ratio Zij in (30) around its deterministic value
yields
Ẑij = −(κ+ 1− η)
(
1 + Z
−1
ij
)
ẑij . (50)
where Zij = z
−(κ+1−η)
ij − 1. Finally, a linear approximation of the ratio of cutoff productivities in
(31) around its deterministic value results in
ẑij =
φij
η − 1
(
V̂ mij − V̂ xij
)
(51)
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where
φij ≡
[
1−
(
τijW i
W j
)1−η]−1
> 1.
We can express zij in (49) as
zij =
[(
fij
1− fij
)(
1
φij − 1
)]1/(η−1)
.
Replacing this expression in the one for Zij , and, in turn, in (50), together with (51), we get
Ẑij = −(κ+ 1− η)
1 +
[( fij
1− fij
)(
1
φij − 1
)]−κ+1−η
η−1
− 1
−1
 φij
η − 1
(
V̂ mij − V̂ xij
)
(52)
Replacing (52) and V̂ mij and V̂
x
ij with (27) and (28), respectively, in (A), we obtain (32) in the paper,
with coefficients defined as
Φ
1
ij ≡ Φij
[
D2,j + η (1−mj)
]
> 0,
Φ
2
ij ≡ Φij
[
D2,j +
η
2
(1− 2mj)
]
> 0,
Φ
3
ij ≡ Φij
η
2
> 0,
where
Φij ≡ (κ+ 1− η)φij
[
1−
(
fij
1− fij
1
φij − 1
)κ+1−η]−1
.
Finally, notice that yi ≡ Y i/Li = W iη/(η − 1), from (38).
Derivation of Equation (36)
The derivation of (36) mimics the derivation of (32), but the expressions for V̂ mij and V̂
x
ij are
replaced with (25) and (26) instead of (27) and (28), respectively. The linear approximation of zij
in (31) around its deterministic value results in
ẑij = φij
(
−cov
(
C˜j , W˜j − W˜i
)
+
η
2
var
(
W˜j − P˜ Tj
)
− η
2
var
(
W˜i − P˜ Tj
))
.
The ratio of exports to affiliates can be expressed as
R˜ij(s) ≈(η − 1)
(
W˜j(s)− W˜i(s)
)
+ Φij
[
cov
(
C˜j , W˜j − W˜i
)
− η
2
var
(
W˜j − P˜ Tj
)
+
η
2
var
(
W˜i − P˜ Tj
)]
.
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From (20) to (19), we get
var(W˜j − P˜ Tj ) = mjvar(W˜j),
var(W˜i − P˜ Tj ) = var(W˜i) + (1−mj)2var(W˜j)− 2(1−mj), cov(W˜i, W˜j),
cov(C˜j , W˜j) = D2,jvar(W˜j),
where cov(W˜i, W˜j) = D
−1
2,jcov(C˜j , W˜i). Replacing these expressions into the expression for R˜ij(s)
above, we get (36) in the paper, with coefficients defined by
Ψ
1
ij ≡
Φij
D2,i
· [D2,i + η (1−mj)] > 0,
Ψ
2
ij ≡ Φij
[
D2,i +
η
2
(1− 2mj)
]
> 0,
Ψ
3
ij ≡ Φij
η
2
> 0,
The coefficient Ψ2ij is positive as long as mj ≤ 0.5.
B Multi-industry Model
There are H tradable-good sectors. Each industry h produces a CES composite good Qh that
aggregates a continuum of varieties,
Qhi (s) =
(∫
z
qhi (z)
ηh
ηh−1dGi(z)
) ηh−1
ηh
. (53)
The parameter ηh is the elasticity of substitution among varieties within a given industry h. In-
dustries in the tradable sector are aggregated into tradable consumption according to
Qi(s) =
H∏
h=1
Qhi (s)
βh , (54)
where βh ∈ [0, 1], and
∑H
h=1 βh = 1. Total expenditure in industry h is a constant share of aggregate
demand,
P hj (s)Q
h
j (s) = (1− α)βhPjCj(s). (55)
Expenditure on a variety z in industry h is given by the familiar expenditure function derived
from CES preferences.
Tradable goods are produced with a linear technology and face an industry-specific shock,
Ah(s), that is common across countries, qh(z, s) = zAh(s)lh(z, s). The optimal pricing rule for the
firm is the standard constant markup over marginal cost, although now the marginal cost includes
the industry-specific shock. For example, the pricing rule for an exporter is
ph,mij (z, s) = τ
h
ij
ηh
ηh − 1
Wi(s)
Ah(s)z
, (56)
where τhij is industry-country-pair specific.
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As in the body of the paper, it is convenient to define Zhi (s) as the index that aggregates the
productivity of domestic firms, importers, and foreign affiliates, in industry h, supplying i,
Zhi (s) = Z
h,d
ii +
I∑
j=1
(
τji
Wj(s)
Wi(s)
)1−η
Zh,xji +
I∑
j=1
Zh,mji . (57)
The price index for each industry h in country i is then given by
P hi (s) =
ηh
ηh − 1
Wi(s)
Ah(s)
Zhi (s)
1
1−ηh . (58)
The profits of a firm, if exporting or opening an affiliate are, respectively,
pih,xij (z, s) =
1
ηh
zη
h−1
Zhj (s)
[
Wi(s)
Wj(s)
τhij
]1−ηh
P hj (s)Q
h
j (s), (59)
pih,mij (z, s) =
1
ηh
zη
h−1
Zhj (s)
P hj (s)Q
h
j (s). (60)
The industry shock equally affects all firms in the industry and, therefore, does not affect a firm’s
market share. The only way that the industry shock may affect the firm’s profit (and, hence, the
export/FDI decision) is through country j’s expenditure in sector h, given by P hj (s)Q
h
j (s). With
constant expenditure shares across industries in the tradable sector—a consequence of (54)—this
second channel also cancels out.
Analogous to the derivations for a single industry model, a second-order Taylor expansion of
the ratio of cutoff productivities around its deterministic value yields
ẑhij ≈ Φ1,hij cov(Y˜j , Y˜i)− Φ2,hij var(Y˜j)− Φ3,hij var(Y˜i), (61)
where Φ1,hij , Φ
2,h
ij , and Φ
3,h
ij are analogous to the coefficients in (32), with the elasticity of substitu-
tion, ηh, the transport cost, τhij , and the share of imports in the price index, m
h
j , industry specific.
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sales to unaffiliated parties, as a share of total affiliate sales 
Notes: The data cover majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. parents with more than 25 mil-
lions in sales, assets, or net income, which are required to report sales to local unaffiliated par-
ties. The sample is restricted to parent-affiliate pairs in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 1: Distribution of affiliates by share of sales to local unaffiliated parties, 1999. UPDATE
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Share of total sales to Share of U.S. affiliates’ employment
local unaffiliated parties in total host-country employment
All affiliates Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3)
ARG Argentina 0.855 0.008 0.003
AUS Australia 0.848 0.033 0.016
AUT Austria 0.593 0.009 0.005
BEL Belgium 0.532 0.034 0.018
BRA Brazil 0.793 0.007 0.004
CAN Canada 0.679 0.069 0.029
CHE Switzerland 0.689 0.015 0.005
CHL Chile 0.841 0.011 0.004
COL Colombia 0.794 0.003 0.001
DNK Denmark 0.705 n/a n/a
ESP Spain 0.808 0.011 0.008
FIN Finland 0.714 n/a n/a
FRA France 0.620 0.021 0.009
GBR Great Britain 0.646 0.039 0.016
DEU Germany 0.645 0.017 0.012
GRC Greece 0.840 0.003 0.002
HKG Hong Kong 0.620 0.028 0.011
IDN Indonesia 0.824 0.001 0.000
IRL Ireland 0.382 0.057 0.044
ISR Israel 0.673 0.023 0.011
ITA Italy 0.687 0.009 0.006
JPN Japan 0.907 0.005 0.002
KOR Korea 0.872 0.004 0.002
MEX Mexico 0.632 0.122 0.092
MYS Malaysia 0.639 0.017 0.014
NZL Netherlands 0.885 0.081 0.040
NOR Norway 0.773 0.028 n/a
NLD New Zealand 0.579 0.004 0.002
PER Peru 0.969 0.001 0.000
PHL Philippines 0.629 0.019 0.014
PRT Portugal 0.746 n/a na
SGP Singapore 0.485 0.026 0.017
SWE Sweden 0.719 0.003 n/a
THA Thailand 0.655 0.004 0.003
TUR Turkey 0.810 n/a na
TWN Taiwan 0.719 0.001 0.000
VEN Venezuela 0.935 0.01 0.005
ZAF South Africa 0.895 0.010 0.004
Notes: Column 1 reports sales by U.S. affiliates (majority-owned, non-bank) to unaffiliated parties in
country j, as a share of total affiliate sales, for parent-affiliate pairs in the manufacturing sector. Column
2 reports employment in U.S. affiliates in country j, as a share of country j’s total employment; column
3 includes only U.S. affiliates in manufacturing.
Table 1: Local sales and employment of U.S. affiliates abroad, 1999.
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cor(C˜j , Y˜j) cor(N˜Xj , Y˜j) cor(W˜j , Y˜j)
(1) (2) (3)
ARG* 0.95 -0.68 n/a
AUS 0.07 0.25 -0.04
AUT 0.79 -0.38 0.29
BEL 0.94 -0.44 0.53
BRA* 0.95 -0.16 n/a
CAN 0.89 -0.35 -0.11
CHE 0.78 -0.48 n/a
CHL* 0.95 -0.38 n/a
COL* 0.91 -0.66 n/a
DNK 0.94 -0.55 0.20
ESP 0.95 -0.65 -0.23
FIN 0.91 -0.41 0.40
FRA 0.93 -0.26 0.30
GBR 0.94 -0.68 0.47
GER 0.87 -0.38 0.41
GRC 0.94 -0.13 -0.04
HKG* 0.81 -0.39 n/a
IDN* 0.79 -0.59 n/a
IRL 0.88 -0.50 0.48
ISR* 0.88 -0.04 0.58
ITA 0.93 -0.63 0.25
JPN 0.95 -0.37 0.66
KOR 0.87 -0.55 0.28
MEX 0.96 -0.60 -0.26
MYS* 0.81 -0.51 n/a
NLD 0.94 -0.37 0.48
NOR 0.73 -0.42 0.31
NZL 0.84 -0.42 -0.01
PER* 0.95 -0.29 n/a
PHL* 0.93 -0.64 n/a
PRT 0.90 -0.56 0.53
SGP* 0.97 n/a n/a
SWE 0.92 -0.32 0.09
THA* 0.92 -0.75 n/a
TUR 0.86 -0.44 n/a
TWN* 1.00 n/a n/a
USA 0.99 -0.56 0.40
VEN* 0.70 -0.15 n/a
ZAF* 0.64 -0.39 n/a
Total 0.87 -0.43 0.26
OECD 0.89 -0.40 0.26
non-OECD 0.83 -0.45 n/a
Notes: Y˜j is log real GDP per capita at constant 2005 prices, PPP ad-
justed, from the Penn World Table 7.1 (“RGDPL”). C˜j , is log real absorp-
tion, calculated as GDP minus net exports, both at current prices in local
currency, deflated by the GDP deflator in country j, from the World De-
velopment Indicators. W˜j is total compensation of employees in current
U.S. dollars, PPP adjusted, divided by total employees, in the manufac-
turing sector, from the OECD STAN database, deflated by the U.S. CPI.
All variables are for the period 1970-2004, detrended using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100. Countries marked with ∗
correspond to the non-OECD sample.
Table 2: Cross-country comovements.
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log(exports/affiliate sales) from BEA log(exports/affiliate sales) from Census
N obs Mean Std N obs Mean Std
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ARG* 78 −0.891 2.524 23 −1.678 2.356
AUS 123 −0.646 2.513 37 −1.307 1.780
AUT 71 −1.066 2.586 20 −1.593 2.810
BEL 113 0.329 2.662 36 0.507 2.938
BRA* 113 −1.292 2.128 38 −1.568 2.194
CAN 147 0.562 1.644 45 0.395 1.418
CHE 90 0.161 2.229 27 −0.293 2.083
CHL* 51 −0.856 1.846 15 −0.947 1.502
COL* 53 −0.908 1.863 14 −0.972 1.733
DNK 65 −0.379 2.387 18 −0.429 2.595
ESP 115 −1.526 2.194 36 −1.914 1.455
FIN 57 −0.431 2.289 20 −0.516 1.853
FRA 136 −1.456 2.050 45 −1.836 1.789
GBR 140 −1.292 1.669 45 −1.186 1.328
GER 129 −1.252 1.729 44 −1.201 1.661
GRC 41 −2.041 2.502 15 −2.353 2.025
HKG* 76 1.329 2.885 22 0.817 1.505
IDN 52 −0.780 3.262 15 −1.471 2.062
IRL 81 0.337 2.702 25 0.055 2.538
ISR* 45 0.951 2.156 14 0.203 2.019
ITA 131 −1.238 2.435 43 −1.148 2.357
JPN 105 0.551 1.854 32 0.216 1.674
KOR 78 0.918 2.230 26 0.005 1.807
MEX 128 1.369 2.385 39 1.073 2.745
MYS* 60 0.372 2.265 19 −0.070 2.541
NZL 59 −0.467 1.706 14 −0.672 2.229
NOR 48 −0.651 1.934 11 −1.340 2.324
NLD 124 0.034 1.718 39 −0.219 1.895
PER* 33 −1.066 2.696 11 −0.772 3.466
PHL* 58 −0.324 2.509 17 −0.229 2.450
PRT 62 −1.710 2.538 22 −2.583 2.039
SGP* 76 1.534 2.472 25 1.101 2.001
SWE 91 −0.630 2.049 27 −1.179 1.797
THA* 76 −0.099 2.065 22 −0.737 1.342
TUR 43 −1.517 2.041 13 −1.820 2.007
TWN* 66 1.244 2.284 22 0.378 2.342
VEN* 70 −0.609 2.356 19 −1.484 2.185
ZAF* 74 −1.038 1.854 23 −1.597 1.726
Total 3158 −0.363 2.410 978 −0.709 2.236
OECD 2177 −0.452 2.345 679 −0.747 2.222
non-OECD 981 −0.167 2.538 299 −0.623 2.269
Notes: In all columns, affiliate sales refer to sales to local unaffiliated parties made by affiliates of U.S. multinationals,
from the BEA. In columns 1–3, exports are total exports from Feenstra et al. (2002) minus exports of U.S. parents to their
affiliates as reported by the BEA. In columns 4–6, exports are unrelated-party exports from the U.S. Census Bureau. An
observation is a country-industry-year, where an industry is a three-digit ISI code. Columns 1–3 include 1994, 1999 and
2004; columns 4–6 include only 2004. Countries marked with ∗ correspond to the non-OECD sample. Total refers to the
average ratio over all country-industry-year observations.
Table 3: Summary statistics, export-affiliate-sales ratio.
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cor(Y˜u, Y˜j) std(Y˜j) cor(W˜u, C˜j) std(W˜j) std(C˜j)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ARG* 0.01 0.04 n/a n/a 0.082
AUS 0.58 0.02 -0.013 0.02 0.019
AUT 0.42 0.02 -0.13 0.02 0.019
BEL 0.35 0.02 -0.27 0.04 0.021
BRA* 0.37 0.04 n/a n/a 0.047
CAN 0.84 0.03 0.29 0.02 0.026
CHE 0.66 0.02 n/a n/a 0.033
CHL* 0.08 0.07 n/a n/a 0.073
COL* -0.15 0.03 n/a n/a 0.041
DNK 0.74 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.028
ESP 0.32 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.038
FIN 0.40 0.04 -0.19 0.04 0.045
FRA 0.42 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.020
GBR 0.77 0.03 0.36 0.03 0.032
GER 0.41 0.02 -0.13 0.03 0.021
GRC 0.45 0.03 0.82 0.04 0.030
HKG* 0.08 0.04 n/a n/a 0.053
IDN* -0.20 0.04 n/a n/a 0.060
IRL 0.45 0.04 0.23 0.02 0.041
ISR* -0.07 0.03 -0.26 0.04 0.043
ITA 0.35 0.02 -0.20 0.02 0.026
JPN 0.23 0.02 -0.43 0.02 0.025
KOR 0.18 0.04 -0.17 0.05 0.054
MEX -0.19 0.04 0.37 0.04 0.053
MYS* -0.27 0.05 n/a n/a 0.091
NLD 0.60 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.025
NOR 0.42 0.02 0.29 0.03 0.048
NZL 0.24 0.03 -0.25 0.02 0.048
PER* 0.03 0.06 n/a n/a 0.077
PHL* -0.35 0.04 n/a n/a 0.058
PRT 0.22 0.05 0.19 0.01 0.048
SGP* -0.22 0.04 n/a n/a n/a
SWE 0.47 0.03 0.36 0.02 0.027
THA* -0.36 0.05 n/a n/a 0.081
TUR 0.26 0.04 n/a n/a 0.049
TWN* 0.45 0.03 n/a n/a n/a
VEN* 0.12 0.06 n/a n/a 0.105
ZAF* -0.21 0.02 n/a n/a 0.042
Total 0.23 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.05
OECD 0.42 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03
non-OECD 0.26 0.04 n/a n/a 0.05
Notes: Y˜j is log real GDP per capita at constant 2005 prices, PPP adjusted, from the Penn
World Table 7.1 (“RGDPL”). C˜j is log real absorption, calculated as GDP minus net exports,
both at current prices in local currency, deflated by the GDP deflator in country j, from the
World Development Indicators. W˜j is total compensation of employees in current U.S. dol-
lars, PPP adjusted, divided by total employees, in the manufacturing sector, from the OECD
STAN database, deflated by the U.S. CPI. All variables are for the period 1970-2004, detrended
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100. Countries marked with ∗
correspond to the non-OECD sample.
Table 4: Within-country comovements.
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All countries OECD Non-OECD
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
freighthj 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.19
tariffhj 6.79 6.78 5.14 4.77 10.46 8.86
log(distj) 8.90 0.62 8.76 0.64 9.21 0.43
log(Yj/Lj) −0.67 0.69 −0.34 0.33 −1.39 0.72
log(Yj) −3.02 1.02 −2.76 1.03 −3.62 0.70
schoolingj 2.18 0.19 2.27 0.08 1.97 0.20
expr.riskj 7.30 2.18 8.07 2.01 5.60 1.48
com.langj (1=yes,0=no) 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.47
borderj (1=yes,0=no) 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00
landlockj (1=yes, 0=no) 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00
mj 0.33 0.22 0.32 0.14 0.38 0.35
Absj 0.99 0.04 0.99 0.04 1.00 0.04
NonProdh 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09
# observations 3067 2119 948
# countries 38 23 15
Notes: Output, Y˜j , is log real GDP per capita at constant 2005 prices, PPP adjusted, from the Penn World Table 7.1
(“RGDPL”). Absorption, C˜j , is log real absorption, and Absj is the ratio of absorption to GDP; absorption is calculated
as GDP minus net exports, both at current prices in local currency, deflated by the GDP deflator in country j, from
the World Development Indicators. W˜j is total compensation of employees in current U.S. dollars, PPP adjusted,
divided by total employees, in the manufacturing sector, from the OECD STAN database, deflated by the U.S. CPI. All
variables are for the period 1970-2004, detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100. Real
GDP and real GDP are relative to the United States. Tariff, freight rates, and the industry index of non-production to
production workers (NonProdh) are from Helpman et al. (2004). The distance, common language, and border variables
are from CEPII; the landlocked variable is computed by the authors. Schooling—the number of years of educational
attainment—is from Barro and Lee (2000). The expropriation risk index is from Beck et al. (2001). Averages and standard
deviations are taken over the pooled sample.
Table 5: Summary statistics, country-level controls.
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log(Rj) log(R
h
j )
By Country By Country-Industry
Pooled Pooled Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cov(Y˜j , Y˜U ) −1, 208∗∗ −1, 484.0∗∗∗ −2, 245.0∗∗∗ −1, 923.0∗∗∗ −2, 331.0∗∗∗−2, 018.0∗∗∗
(559.5) (525.2) (444.1) (437.8) (471.7) (468.4)
var(Y˜j) 256.80
∗∗∗ 233.3∗∗ 310.4∗∗∗ 268.3∗∗ 272.8∗∗ 253.9∗
(93.08) (96.24) (116.3) (128.7) (120.5) (136.9)
freighthj −12.370 −8.212 −0.213 −0.213 −0.375 −0.379
(8.393) (7.395) (0.412) (0.324) (0.419) (0.355)
tariffhj −0.064∗∗ −0.076∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.012 −0.030∗∗ −0.015
(0.029) (0.031) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
log(distj) 0.156 −0.006 −0.508∗∗∗ 0.133 −0.494∗∗∗ 0.030
(0.240) (0.302) (0.137) (0.367) (0.137) (0.385)
log(Yj/Lj) −0.342 −0.380 0.275 0.252 0.258 0.241
(0.234) (0.295) (0.190) (0.282) (0.200) (0.340)
log(Yj) −0.138 −0.165 −0.143
(0.120) (0.151) (0.168)
schoolingj −0.871 −0.372 −0.404
(0.991) (0.811) (0.834)
exp.riskj 0.152
∗∗∗ 0.103∗ 0.094
(0.048) (0.059) (0.068)
com.langj −0.008 0.105 0.101
(0.254) (0.263) (0.290)
borderj 0.008 1.681
∗∗ 1.487∗∗
(0.771) (0.705) (0.745)
landlockj 0.0404 0.058 0.178
(0.368) (0.336) (0.367)
Industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Observations 114 114 3,067 3,067 1,341 1,341
R2 adj. 0.280 0.455 0.0373 0.0795 0.0525 0.0904
Notes: OLS estimates of (34). In columns 1-4, the observations are pooled across 1994, 1999, and 2004. In
columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the average over the three years. In columns 1 and 2, the depen-
dent variable is the ratio of U.S. exports to affiliate sales to country j. In columns 3–6, the ratio is computed
by industry h (three-digit ISI classification). Robust standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered by
country and industry. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Table 6: Baseline estimation.
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SD OLS Coef. Beta Coef.
Pooled Average Pooled Average Pooled Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logRhuj 2.362 2.312
cov(Y˜u, Y˜j) 0.00021 0.00021 −1, 923.0∗∗∗ −2, 018.0∗∗∗ −0.17 −0.18
var(Y˜j) 0.00089 0.0009 268.3
∗∗ 253.9∗ 0.10 0.10
freighthj 0.137 0.142 −0.213 −0.379 −0.01 −0.02
tariffhj 6.784 6.874 −0.012 −0.015 −0.03 −0.04
log(distj) 0.616 0.585 0.133 0.0296 0.03 0.01
log Yj/Lj 0.686 0.709 0.252 0.241 0.07 0.07
Notes: Beta coefficients associated with the estimated coefficients in table 6, columns 3 (pooled) and 5
(average). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Table 7: Beta coefficients from the baseline estimation.
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log(Rhj )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cov(Y˜j , Y˜U ) -2,000*** -3,593*** -1,776*** -3,373***
(526.4) (1,171) (505.8) (823.7)
var(Y˜j) 278.7** 226.9 76.12 339.4
(130.3) (297.7) (78.82) (243.7)
Ej × cov(Y˜j , Y˜U ) 7,483
(9,066)
Ej 5.898**
(2.760)
mj × cov(Y˜j , Y˜U ) 7,291**
(3,136)
mj × var(Y˜j) 433.7
(938.8)
mj 0.861
(1.630)
Absj × cov(Y˜j , Y˜U ) -31,495***
(10,292)
Absj × var(Y˜j) 10,836***
(2,991)
Absj 0.511
(1.900)
NonProdh × cov(Y˜j , Y˜U ) 4,942**
(2,368)
NonProdh × var(Y˜j) -252.3
(721.2)
cov(C˜j , W˜U ) -758.4
(805.5)
var(W˜j) 533.5**
(227.7)
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,067 3,067 3,068 3,075 2,039
R2 adj. 0.0837 0.133 0.131 0.100 0.110
Notes: In column 1, Ej is the share of U.S. affiliate employment in the total em-
ployment; in column 2, mj is the share of the ratio of imports to GDP; in column 3,
Absj is absorption to GDP; in column 4, NonProdh is an industry-index of the ratio
of non-production to production workers in a plant; and in column 5 cov(Cj ,Wu)
is the covariance between domestic absorption in country j and the unit cost in the
United States, while var(Wj) is the variance of the unit cost in country j. Country
controls include: freight, tariff, log(dist), log(Yj/Lj), log(Yj), schooling, exp. risk,
com.lang, border, and landlock. Robust standard errors in parentheses, two-way
clustered by country and industry. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Table 8: Additional implications of the model.
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log(Rhj )
1994 1999 2004 2004 Census
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cov(Y˜j , Y˜U ) -2,235*** -1,920*** -2,117*** -1,770*** -2,465*** -2,234*** -2,253*** -2,320***
(596.5) (508.8) (460.8) (496.3) (345.3) (444.1) (387.0) (472.2)
var(Y˜j) 388.4*** 260.8* 305.5*** 342.9** 224.9* 212.0* 238.1* 214.3*
(139.6) (152.1) (110.3) (134.7) (129.4) (116.3) (143.4) (127.6)
freighthj 0.607 0.368 -0.219 -0.145 -0.660 -0.645* -0.432 -0.443
(0.634) (0.529) (0.339) (0.292) (0.419) (0.384) (0.356) (0.302)
tariffhj -0.0276 -0.00241 -0.0260* -0.00886 -0.0373*** -0.0281* -0.0343** -0.0227
(0.0172) (0.0152) (0.0156) (0.0166) (0.0142) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0147)
log(distj) -0.333** 0.251 -0.495*** 0.221 -0.757*** -0.229 -0.632*** -0.376
(0.143) (0.394) (0.168) (0.378) (0.105) (0.381) (0.111) (0.407)
log(Yj/Lj) 0.306 0.0514 0.265 0.463 0.271 0.294 0.242 0.152
(0.244) (0.331) (0.180) (0.290) (0.188) (0.291) (0.213) (0.312)
log(Yj) -0.305 -0.0508 -0.0987 -0.108
(0.187) (0.152) (0.129) (0.131)
schoolingj 0.634 -1.078 -0.790 -0.260
(0.826) (0.873) (1.089) (1.126)
exp.riskj 0.0817 0.0963* 0.124** 0.121**
(0.0653) (0.0581) (0.0624) (0.0592)
com.langj 0.0758 0.213 0.0314 0.257
(0.322) (0.262) (0.249) (0.249)
borderj 1.774** 1.747** 1.248* 0.723
(0.792) (0.748) (0.744) (0.785)
landlockj 0.369 -0.0433 -0.150 -0.0394
(0.387) (0.327) (0.343) (0.336)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,086 1,086 1,080 1,080 846 846 902 902
R2 adj. 0.0228 0.0716 0.0393 0.0836 0.0639 0.0893 0.0545 0.0891
Notes: OLS estimates of (34) for 1994, 1999, and 2004, separately. In columns 1-6, industries are defined
by the three-digit, SIC-based ISI classification. In columns 7 and 8, industries are defined by the 4-digit,
NAICS-based ISI and exports are measured using unrelated-party trade data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered by country and industry. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Table 9: Robustness to alternative time periods and measures of exports.
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log(Rhj )
OECD Non-OECD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cov(Y˜j , Y˜U ) -1,751** -3,281** -2,562*** -1,966***
(865.3) (1,359) (309.0) (562.7)
var(Y˜j) 864.8* 944.5** 150.6** 82.68
(470.9) (478.3) (61.98) (113.6)
freighthj 0.00370 -0.138 -0.575* -0.527*
(1.075) (0.892) (0.336) (0.297)
tariffhj -0.0395* -0.0185 -0.0145 -0.0153
(0.0237) (0.0216) (0.0130) (0.0162)
log(distj) -0.515*** -0.670 -0.392*** -0.0302
(0.162) (1.202) (0.137) (0.347)
log(Yj/Lj) 0.771 1.186 0.403** 0.465
(0.540) (1.355) (0.193) (0.315)
log(Yj) -0.0641 -0.197
(0.172) (0.232)
schoolingj -4.256 -0.678
(3.671) (1.063)
exp.riskj 0.225** 0.0237
(0.0926) (0.0925)
com.langj 0.220 -0.275
(0.450) (0.386)
borderj -0.215
(2.266)
landlockj -0.0401
(0.610)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,119 2,119 948 948
R2 adj. 0.0312 0.0921 -0.0738 -0.0734
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 correspond to the pooled OLS esti-
mation of (34), for OECD and non-OECD countries, respec-
tively. In columns 2 and 4, the set of controls is expanded to
include the variables in section 5.1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses, two-way clustered by country and industry.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% respectively.
Table 10: Robustness to sample of countries.
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Probit log(Rhj )
Baseline Pr ≥ 0 Pr ≥ 0.25 Pr ≥ 0.5 Pr ≥ 0.75 Pr ≥ 0.90 Pr ≥ 0.95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cov(Y˜j , Y˜U ) -444.0 -1,923*** -1,923*** -1,864*** -1,798*** -1,490** -1,611** -1,046*
(544.7) (437.8) (437.8) (449.0) (473.3) (643.8) (669.0) (630.4)
var(Y˜j) 49.15 268.3** 268.3** 269.9** 326.8** 353.8** 401.9* 449.6**
(85.47) (128.7) (128.7) (130.5) (138.8) (173.9) (218.8) (220.3)
freighthj 0.0815 -0.213 -0.213 -0.461 -0.329 -0.398 -0.128 0.738
(0.213) (0.324) (0.324) (0.320) (0.592) (0.693) (0.369) (0.882)
tariffhj 0.0219*** -0.0120 -0.0120 -0.0160 -0.0246* -0.0284** -0.0283 -0.0355**
(0.00833) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0138) (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0177) (0.0158)
log(distj) -0.641** 0.133 0.133 0.232 0.214 0.669 0.962 1.214*
(0.301) (0.367) (0.367) (0.380) (0.410) (0.599) (0.711) (0.664)
log(Yj/Lj) 0.212 0.252 0.252 0.200 -0.0663 0.0525 -0.0307 -0.0485
(0.222) (0.282) (0.282) (0.285) (0.270) (0.335) (0.344) (0.133)
log(Yj) 0.606*** -0.165 -0.165 -0.202 -0.237 -0.224 -0.219 -0.187
(0.142) (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) (0.153) (0.154) (0.161) (0.168)
schoolingj 1.123 -0.372 -0.372 -0.383 0.0354 -0.615 -0.0621 -0.463
(0.723) (0.811) (0.811) (0.837) (0.925) (1.208) (1.284) (1.229)
exp.riskj -0.0137 0.103* 0.103* 0.115* 0.166*** 0.158** 0.193*** 0.219***
(0.0438) (0.0588) (0.0588) (0.0587) (0.0582) (0.0635) (0.0654) (0.0598)
com.langj 0.568** 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.000886 -0.0194 -0.0951 -0.309
(0.231) (0.263) (0.263) (0.268) (0.274) (0.332) (0.361) (0.372)
borderj -0.0609 1.681** 1.681** 1.798** 1.666** 2.389** 2.905** 3.343***
(0.641) (0.705) (0.705) (0.726) (0.754) (1.100) (1.302) (1.195)
landlockj 0.526** 0.0583 0.0583 -0.0343 -0.0285 -0.269 -0.459 -0.422
(0.240) (0.336) (0.336) (0.341) (0.335) (0.425) (0.568) (0.648)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,353 3,067 3,067 2,945 2,538 1,886 1,223 849
R2 adj. 0.0795 0.0795 0.0913 0.109 0.129 0.142 0.0905
Notes: Column 1 correspond to the probit of finding a valid observation for a given country-industry. Columns
2 to 8 correspond to the pooled OLS estimation of (34) restricting the sample to country-industry observations
for which this probability is larger than the corresponding cutting point. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
two-way clustered by country and industry. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively.
Table 11: Robustness to alternative time periods and measures of exports.
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International Surveys Industry 1987 Standard Industrial Classification
201 Meat Products 201
202 Dairy Products 202
203 Vegetables and Preserves 203
204 Grain Mill Products 204
205 Bakery Products 205
208 Beverages 208
209 Other Food 209, 206, 207
210 Tobacco 210
220 Textiles 22
230 Apparel 23
240 Wood and Lumber 24
250 Furniture 25
262 Pulp and Paper 261, 262, 263
265 Processed Paper 265, 267
271 Newsprint 271
272 Other publishing 272, 273, 274
275 Commercial Printing 275, 276, 277, 278, 279
281 Industrial Chemicals 281, 282, 286
283 Drugs 283
284 Soap and Cleansing Products 284
287 Agricultural Chemicals 287
289 Other Industrial Chemicals 285, 289
305 Rubber 301, 302, 305, 306
308 Miscellaneous Plastics 308
310 Leather 31
321 Glass 321, 322, 323
329 Stone, Minerals, and Ceramics 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329
331 Ferrous metals 331, 332, 339
335 Non-Ferrous metals 333, 334, 335, 336
341 Metal Cans, Fabricated Metal 341
342 Cutlery 342
343 Heating and Plumbing Equipment 343
349 Metal Services 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349
351 Engines and Turbines 351
352 Farm Machinery 352
353 Construction Machinery 353
354 Metalworking Machinery 354
355 Special Industrial Machinery 355
356 General Industrial Machinery 356
357 Computers 357
358 Refrigeration Equipment 358
359 Other Industrial Equipment 359
363 Household Appliances 363
366 Audio, Video, Communications Equipment 365, 366
367 Electronic Components 367
369 Other Electronics 361, 362, 364, 369
371 Motor Vehicles 371
379 Other Transport Equipment 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 379
381 Scientific and Measuring Equipment 381, 382
384 Medical Equipment 384
386 Optical and Photographic Equipment 385, 386
390 Miscellaneous Manufacturers 39
Table 12: Industry concordance: SIC 1987 to ISI.
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